TNAG-1790-FCO40-2550-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-resettlement-in-third-countri-1988 — Page 123

CONFIDENTIAL

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RECORD OF A BREAKFAST MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND MR GEORGE SHULTZ (0745-0900) AT 1 CARLTON GARDENS, FRIDAY 3 JUNE 1988

Secretary of State HMA Washington Sir John Fretwell Mr Galsworthy

Mr Meyer, News Dept Mr Burns, NAD

PRESENT

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Mr George Shultz

Ambassador Price, US Embassy, London Ms Ridgway, State Department

Mr Redman, State Department Spokesman Mr Pendleton, US Embassy

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MOSCOW SUMMIT AND FOLLOW-UP

1.

Mr Shultz explained the background to the "argument" at the end of the visit. The Secretary of State had often referred to the strategy which the West needed to pursue in dealings with the Soviet Union and which he, Shultz, had encapsulated in his 1983 testimony. The Americans did not favour operating on the basis of principles, nor linkage. It was facts which had led the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan, not principles. We had to analyse each area of difficulty with the Soviet Union separately and confront them with the facts. The Americans had applied this policy in recent years and it had paid off. They were accordingly surprised when, at the first meeting with the President, Gorbachev had suggested agreeing a document with language about peaceful co-existence and peaceful international behaviour. It had taken 3 days of Ms Ridgway's time and argument to convince Soviet officials that the US was not prepared to revert to the stale language of detente and eventually "very good language" had been agreed. However, at the final session with the President, Gorbachev again tried to persuade the President to accept the original Soviet formulations. The President quietly and repeatedly refused. The Americans had noticed a stage in meetings with Gorbachev over the years where "he goes bananas over something" On this occasion,

Gorbachev became enraged and continued to complain, while the President stood firm. It was clear at the departure ceremonies in St George's Hall and at Gorbachev's subsequent press conference that he was still "seething" at the President's refusal. Furthermore, Gorbachev had not yet learned that the President had "two hot buttons" - on SDI and Nicaragua which, if pressed, evoked deeply-held views. He pressed them both and got the full treatment. Shultz hoped that Gorbachev had now finally accepted that the US was not prepared to revert to a relationship expressed in broad principles. The current stage of the US-Soviet relationship needed something more practical and sustainable. Broad principles had not stopped the Soviet Union going into Afghanistan, supplying Nicaragua and Angola with arms etc. Moreover, Shultz had noticed a pattern to Summitry. Inevitably, after a good Summit, there was a tendency for

CONFIDENTIAL