CONFIDENTIAL
reasons already explained. M. Martin said that he would try to
help.
VIETNAM/EEC
21. M. Martin said that only two countries were now blocking the way
to establishing relations between the European Community and
Vietnam: the UK and the Netherlands. If Vietnam continued to show
goodwill over, for example, Cambodia, it would be useful to establish relations with the Community. It was important not to give the impression that Member States were putting political
obstacles in the way of relations between the Commission and others. It was difficult to explain why the Community could not agree to relations with Vietnam when we had approved the establishement of relations with Cuba. He asked whether the UK was reviewing its
position. Mr McLaren said that our policy had been formulated
largely in response to pressure from ASEAN. M. Martin said that the
FRG had now shifted its position and was no longer objecting.
Mr McLaren said that politically we saw no reason to hurry. It was
only a question of speed. There would be no indefinite block.
was difficult for us to deal with it as a matter of urgency.
M. Martin said that the French would not press the issue before
September, but it would be useful if we could send a positive signal
to Vietnam then. M McLaren said that we would be prepared to review
the situation in September, particularly in the light of progress
over Cambodia. There should be fewer inhibitions on the political
side then. We were not unsympathetic and took note of what M.
Martin had said. M. Martin repeated that it would be better to
have a common position in September. Mr McLaren said that the UK
would not want to hold out against a general consensus.
It
FUTURE STEPS
22. Mr McLaren and M. Martin agreed that it would be useful to meet
again towards the end of September. Mr McLaren undertook to try to give the French an early read-out of the outcome of the Prime
Minister's visit to South East Asia.
CONFIDENTIAL
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