TNAG-1788-FCO40-2548-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-general-1988 — Page 176

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HKD 243/5.

EIVED IN SALE

-OSEP 1938

CAMBODIA: NEXT STEPS

1.

CONFIDENTIAL

REN919

Chala

FROM: D H Gillmore W37 270 2156

CC:

7 September 1988 PS/Lord Glenarthur PS/Mr Eggar

PS/Mr Patten

PS/PUS

PS/Sir J Fretwell

Mr McLaren

150

Mr Gore-Booth, Planners

Mr Gore-Booth, Planners

Mr Cooper, FED

Mr Williams, UND

Mr Hum, HKD

Mr Colvin, SEAD

149

Thank you for sending me a copy of your minute of 6 September recording the Secretary of State's views on Mr Colvin's submission of 5 September.

2.

I much regret that I shall not be in the Office on Friday 9 September and will therefore not be able to attend the Secretary of State's meeting. I have arranged to speak to Mr McLaren on Sunday 11 September before my departure for Moscow. Mr Colvin will also be at the Secretary of State's meeting and will of course accompany me on the Moscow visit.

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3. Meanwhile, the Chinese Chargé called on me today to give a lengthy explanation of Chinese views on Cambodia. I have recorded this in a telegram to Peking and attach a copy. In responding to Mr Zhang's démarche I confined myself to pointing up the difficulties inherent in the Chinese proposal for a political solution. These seem to me to be formidable. Nonetheless, following discussions with Sir C Tickell last week, it does now seem that some pretty informal discussions on Cambodia between the Permanent Members of the Security Council might be a useful step. But I think that this process can only be engaged when we have completed the present round of discussions with the key players, in particular the Russians.

4. Also attached is a copy of a telegram reporting a call by the Vietnamese Ambassador on me on 5 September. We have, I think, to continue to insist on Vietnamese withdrawal as the first and crucial step towards a solution. The Vietnamese and particularly the Russians, will do their best to establish some linkage between the withdrawal process and a political settlement which will exclude the possibility of a return to power by the Khmer Rouge.

CONFIDENTIAL

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