CONFIDENTIAL
c)
acceptance of some rehabilitated long-stayers
especially
hard to resettle individuals who, despite having no family links (and thus no chance of resettlement through present criteria) have the attributes to "make a go of it" here.
d)
Acceptance of privately sponsored individuals/families along the lines of the schemes operated by Canada and Australia.
6.
Refugees under 5a) and b) above meet existing or past criteria. Those in category 5d) do not but would impose no additional burden on the Reception Centres as their sponsors would take this upon themselves. Refugees in 5c) are outside existing or past criteria. But taking some of these cases would have the greatest influence on other resettlement countries in encouraging them to
take long stayers.
7.
(a)
Arguments to be countered
the May 1987 commitment was made after very lengthy Ministerial correspondence and was secured only with the very greatest difficulty. It was moreover intended to extend for two years. It would be inappropriate to modify or add to it now.
b) the international response to our commitment was
.
disappointing. Would further commitment be any more successful in
L stimulating additional resettlement by other governments?
c)
20 a month is as many Vietnamese refugees as the voluntary agencies can handle effectively, given the difficulties of absorbing them into the community.
d)
an additional commitment could encourage others to leave Vietnam illegally.
e)
we already take "rehabilitated long-stayers" as many of those
with family links are already long stayers.
CONFIDENTIAL
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