TNAG-1786-FCO40-2546-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-closed-camp-policy-1988 — Page 191

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

First, resettlement. I note what your report says about our resettlement efforts. It is understandable that people in Hong Kong would like us to do more. However, I believe that our resettlement record since 1975 - almost 13,000 refugees from Hong Kong - is a creditable one. At present we are taking some 20 refugees from Hong Kong per month. In addition we are taking an increasing number of refugees from Vietnam under the Orderly Departure Programme. All this puts considerable demands on our local resources and I regret that I see no scope in present circumstances for any increase in the speed of resettlement. Your report rightly brings out the enormous difficulties involved in resettlement of Vietnamese people in Britain: it must therefore be right to proceed in accordance with our ability to absorb these new arrivals. In addition, as you know, we are persisting in our efforts to persuade other resettlement countries, particularly those which do not face the same immigration pressures as we do, to do more to help. We will continue to take every opportunity to press the case for resettlement as energetically as we

we can.

Secondly, repatriation. At the time of his announcement in May 1987, the Home Secretary referred to the British Government's belief that resettlement alone is not the solution to the Indo-Chinese refugee problem. There is no doubt that the long-term solution lies in the creation of acceptable conditions for the return to Vietnam of those who have left for essentially economic reasons. We are in contact with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the main resettlement countries over this issue. There is active international discussion of the possibility of returning to Vietnam under suitable safeguards those who do not meet the criteria for refugees. Your report accurately identifies the difficulties of implementing such an approach, and emphasises that results will not be quickly achieved. We agree with this assessment, but we will nevertheless pursue our goal vigorously.

Finally, aid to Vietnam. I have taken note of your views, but I have to say that we have strong reservations about providing bilateral aid to Vietnam in present circumstances.

Учпиной

Gemente

THE LORD GLENARTHUR

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