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The China Dimension
9.
Not a question of subordinating our Hong Kong policy to our Chinese policy. The two are consistent: this is how it should be. Our common aim for Hong Kong lies at heart of our relationship with China, gives it unique extra dimension. History shows Hong Kong flourishes when our relations with China are good. Perceived conflict with China has invariably hit confidence in Hong Kong, cf September 1983 currency and stock exchange crises.
10.
We are urged to "stand up" to China. Profoundly misconceived. Publicly confrontational posture would not further our aims. Under such pressure Chinese instinct is to dig in. Ultimately Chinese are capable of placing principle above their own best interests in a stable and prosperous Hong Kong. And in any event public brinkmanship would have devastating effects on confidence. give ourselves satisfaction of noisy opposition to China, but cost would be destruction of Hong Kong.
Representative Government
11.
comitante.
We could
People in Hong Kong untested)
No
Progress on representative government is case in point.
They sense in moving ahead without any reference to Chinese side. are quite capable of dismantling in 1997 anything which goes beyond their own designs for Hong Kong SAR. Nothing would have been achieved except a break in continuity and the undermining of confidence. Hong Kong's interests text beach at by wasting mul
dewithe one copotle of Lasting
bayond 1999.
tengurang stutive, back-
12. Instead consider in Hong Kong's context, not according to some abstract standard what we have achieved:
-
in 1984, commitment in Joint Declaration to "elected" legislature (at time when LegCo was wholly appointed): a major Chinese
concession
in 1985, first introduction of indirectly elected seats to LegCo
in 1988, draft Basic Law confirms there will be significant directly elected element in SAR legislature
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