TNAG-1746-FCO40-2465-Visits-by-FCO-officials-to-Hong-Kong-1988 — Page 43

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

systems, but also one country.

Bound to be areas where ultimate

We must not have unrealistic

sovereign power lies with Peking. expectations of what is ultimately achievable.

Representative Government

Should also recall earlier controversy over representative government. We were accused of caving in to Chinese pressure.

look at the facts.

But

There was no clear support in Hong Kong for direct elections in

Had there been, this would have been a political factor we would have had to take into account. We told the Chinese as much.

1988.

-

But Hong Kong opinion was clearly divided, for a number of

reasons.

This was basis for our decision to move more gradually, introduce direct elections in 1991. Decision was broadly accepted

as a sensible one: controversy is behind us.

-

We would not have been justified in pursuing a different line simply to gratify the calls of a minority for overt confrontation

with Chinese.

Our Intentions

We shall continue to administer Hong Kong with its own best interests as our guide. But it would be foolish to do that without recognition of the transition to Chinese sovereignty in which it is

engaged.

A cooperative relatiionship with China puts us in best position to explain that Hong Kong will flourish and contribute most to China if it is given the full degree of autonomy assured by the Joint

Declaration.

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