TNAG-1745-FCO40-2464-Visits-by-FCO-officials-to-Hong-Kong--including-visit-by-Lor-1988 — Page 26

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Cie dificult

conditions and no prospect of resettlement),

(b)

(c)

CMEA

(a)

au

with the Americans reveal (paragraphs 17-20), they are touchy if mishandled (ie patronised or treated other than on a basis of equality). My subsequent visit to Hong Kong (paragraphs 23-33) was invaluable in that e within the space of 36 hours I was able to contrast the hard but settled existence of Vietnamese farmers in the Red River Delta with the quasi- prison'. conditions which now await those who leave Vietnam in the Hei Ling Ch Detention centre in Hong Kong I know which I would prefer and have little doubt that when the word gets back to Vietnam about the new policy, and associated conditions in Hong Kong camps, the outflow will dry up. The number of June arrivals now coming forward for voluntary repatriation in the detention centres suggests that deterrence is beginning to work. The early repatriation of a batch of volunteers, suitably publicised, could be very effective. I fear that

no alternative but to

be harsh in order, in the long-run, to be kind;

UK/Vietnamese Bilateral Relations (paragraph 10)

I made clear that Vietnam's illegal occupation of Cambodia and the problem of Vietnamese boat people in Hong Kong were difficulties in our bilateral relations. I believe that this message got home: Deputy Foreign Minister Nien talked about a British "two obstacles" policy which sums it up rather well. The Vietnamese say that they would like an early improvement in our bilateral relations, no doubt for economic and developmental reasons. I hope that this will add to the pressure on them to do a suitable deal over repatriation;

Vietnam's Economic Prospects (paragraphs 11 and 12)

The Vietnamese admit that their own mistaken economic policies have contributed to their difficulties, although there are other "objective" causes. The evidence suggests that the country is having difficulty in feeding itself and the leadership is beginning to realise that cooperation with the Soviet Union and OMECON is not an effective alternative to

26-25),

Western assistances. It would mean trading more with the west

and exploiting Vietnam's two

advantages, natural recome

plentid

Vietnamese Foreign Policy (paragraphs 13-20)

and

I was exposed to little more than the party line on Vietnamese policy towards Indo-China. The presentation was not very convincing, although

/abow;

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