TNAG-1720-FCO40-2400-Hong-Kong-1987-Review-of-Representative-Government-1988 — Page 62

CONFIDENTIAL

機密

2.

confidence were regarded as the most important elements. A few

public housing tenants considered that the White Paper was not a

true reflection of public opinion and that China had exerted

influence on the issue.

5.

There was very little support from the overseas media

for the White Paper. Reuters reported that Hong Kong stockbrokers

were attributing a slight upward trend in share prices, to the White Paper's confidence booster.

6.

Opposition to the lack of a partially directly elected

LegCo in 1988 recieved extensive coverage both locally and

overseas. In addition to the nine Legislative Councillors who

expressed disappointment over the delay in introducing direct elections, the pro-democracy pressure groups were quick to voice their disapproval in street rallies and in the local press. An example was the Hong Kong Observers who pointed out that the Hong Kong Government had missed probably its last real opportunity for Britain to leave in Hong Kong a legacy of representative government. They considered it was unlikely that such a system would be in place by 1997. A strong attack came from John Walden, former Director for Home Affairs who warned that the Hong Kong Government had dealt a serious blow to its own credibility as well as the development of democracy. The result would be an increase in emigration, further weakening of the government and an eventual breakdown in law and order. Martin LEE's outspoken opposition to the White Paper was extensively covered by both the local and verseas media. There was no reported support for Martin LEE from the grassroots level of the population.

7.

Favoured comments by many opponents of the White Paper included descriptions of the Government as a lame duck and a regressive government. They also accused Hong Kong of bowing to pressure from China in respect of the latter's wishes concerning

direct elections.

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