TNAG-1719-FCO40-2399-Hong-Kong-1987-Review-of-Representative-Government-1988 — Page 241

CONFIDENTIAL

4. Our next major task will be to prepare for our exchanges with

the Chinese over another major area of difference with them: the

Basic Law provisions on the formation of the first SAR Government. We have already expressed our reservations to them through a variety

of channels. But the draft Basic law still has an annex setting out

a "mainstream option" which would involve the formation of a short-lived provisional government, on the basis of special selection procedures, for the period immediately after 1997. If it is at all possible our objective must be to get these details

removed from the draft of the Basic Law to be published in April/May, pending discussion with the Chinese. At the very least we must persuade the Chinese to present the option in a more

tentative way.

I

5. To do so we must put the maximum pressure on the Chinese.

think we should be ready to argue with them very starkly, in an appropriate context, that we have used up a considerable amount of political capital, both in Westminster and in Hong Kong, in defending our decisions on the timing of direct elections. From now on our actions will be under even closer public and Parliamentary

scrutiny. The ideas for the first SAR Government which are at present being pursued on the Chinese side risk arousing considerable criticism on our side. They will be seen as the antithesis of a

smooth transition a principle which the two sides are committed, through the Joint Declaration, to uphold through their cooperation.

6.

-

Interestingly there are already signs that the Chinese expect us to seek to trade off our adherence to the understanding with them

on direct elections for concessions on their side over the first SAR

Government. They suspect, hwoever, that our motive must be to

preserve our influence after 1997. We shall have to do all we can to persuade them that our ideas are put forward not in our interest but in the interests of continuity and stability in Hong Kong.

7.

The Secretary of State's discussions with Wu next month will offer a good opportunity for this sort of political message to be put across. In addition we have already put the Chinese on notice

that we wish to discuss the matter in a private meeting between Mr McLaren and Ke Zaishuo during JLG IX. It would also be open to

CONFIDENTIAL