7.21 Conclusions and Recommendations. The Committee are concerned at the additional expenditure estimated at $ million in remedial waterproofing works in the basement of the Queen Elizabeth Stadium soon after its completion. T Committee, having heard the evidence and the various submissions, have concluded that responsibility for the matter should be shared amongst the parties concerned. Nevertheless, the Committee are also concerned at the general problem of monitoring the performance of consultants. Given the very large expenditure by the Government on employing consultants, the Committee recommend that effective procedures should be devised for monitoring their performance and for securing remedies should such consultants fail to perform properly.
7.22 The Committee note that the consultants drew an inference from the evidence at the hearing that they had been excluded from the approved list of Architectural Consultants of the Architectural Services Department because of this particular investigation by the Director of Audit. The Committee, having enquired carefully into this matter, are satisfied that this is not the case.
7.23 The Committee are concerned that for the initial remedial works using a liquid waterproofing solution a sum of only $90,000 was recovered from the substructure contractor whereas the total cost incurred was $0.8 million. 7.24 The Committee wish to be informed whether or not the waterproofing remedial works currently in progress prove satisfactory.
7.25 Paragraphs 146-151. Hong Kong Coliseum project. Contractual claims of $18 million and delay in completion of 41 months because of underestimation of the complexity of construction and late changes in the scope of the project. The Committee held hearings on 26 November 1986 (when the witness was the Director of Architectural Services) and on 28 November 1986 (when the witness was the superstructure contractor).
7.26 First hearing. The Director of Architectural Services said that the design had been simple in concept. However the difficulties could not have been unearthed without a detailed investigation before the letting of the contract. At that time the Public Works Programme procedures had not permitted such detailed design before the project had been upgraded to Category A of the Public Works Programme. Another step, Category AB, had now been added to the procedures. This permitted detailed design work to commence before the Government was committed to a project. The Director could not say whether it would have been practical to complete the detailed design before the commencement of the contract in a case, such as this, involving a post-tensioning structure. Considerable design work would still have been necessary during the progress of the construction. Requiring a design to be completed before the building stage could delay the start of a project (in this case by up to two years) with a consequent risk of cost increases. The alternative approach, design as you build, might lead to a prolongation of the contract period with accompanying cost increases. The Director believed that given the nature of the project, the cost of $163 million (averaging $13,500 per seat provided) was reasonable. The Director did not consider that there had been any deficiency in professional practice or in expertise in his Department.
7.27 The Director told the Committee that the Hong Kong Coliseum had been unique in that it had been built as an inverted pyramid on top of a railway station with a very restricted foundation. It would have been difficult to find another site in the urban area on which to build a stadium. Even if such a site had been available it would have needed to be much bigger unless this type of design had been used.
7.28 The Director said that the actual contract period including the extension of time was the true period required for completion. An extension of about 28 months had been granted to the contractor because of bad weather, additional works and constructional difficulties. The additional works had included the installation of an ice-skating rink and a tele-screen. These were major changes requiring substantial design work within the structure.
7.29 Nobody in Hong Kong including the superstructure contractor had ever built a structure like the Hong Kong Coliseum before. A pre-qualification of contractors should have been carried out in order to select a contractor who had the expertise in this type of post-tensioning structure. The Director thought that the superstructure contractor did not have such expertise. Had he had the organizational capability, he could have planned his work better.
7.30 The Director said that the superstructure contractor had been paid $8.6 million, the roof contractor $3 million, the air-conditioning contractor $4.5 million, the electrical contractor $2 million and the fire services installation contractor $0.3 million, making $18.4 million in claims.
7.31 The Director said that the Urban Council's approval for the funds of the ice-skating rink was sought in the first place. However as this had been a Government project, the approval of the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council had also been sought.
7.32 The Director said that the Government was negotiating with the Urban Council for the recovery of the additional expenditure resulting from additional works by the Urban Council. There were procedures for ordering variations after the start of a contract. He would view requests for variation with an open mind. The Government realized that it would be expensive to change the scope of a project during construction. However if the change had not been allowed, the Government might have ended up with a white elephant.
7.33 Discussion on this item was then adjourned in order to give the superstructure contractor an opportunity to appear before the Committee.
7.34 Second hearing. The superstructure contractor said that he had been given detailed designs only in the course of construction and was asked to provide solutions when problems had been encountered. He had commissioned a report (see footnote) by a structural engineering consultant which had been endorsed by a professor in concrete structures and
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Footnote: A copy of the report was given to the Committee.
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