TNAG-1638-FCO40-2282-Future-of-Hong-Kong-withdrawal-of-the-British-garrison-1987 — Page 86

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SECRET UK EYES A

then the presumptions of stability and prosperity in Hong Kong on which the Joint Declaration is based would no longer apply.

The HKG therefore see the essential role of the Garrison from

1994 onwards as a presence demonstrating to all concerned, including the PRCG, the UK's commitment and sovereignty, rather than as a force with an operational responsibility for maintenance of IS. The HKG wishes the Garrison presence to be no larger than would be commensurate with that objective, but recognises that it is primarily for HMG to determine exactly what level of forces would be necessary to perform that role. The HKG is concerned, however, that maximum flexibility should be retained

in HMG's planning for the final, post 1992/3 period. To this end they have sought a specific commitment from HMG that a full review be carried out in 1992/3 before final decisions on the last stages of garrison withdrawal are taken.

THE REQUIREMENT AND INTENTIONS OF HMG.

33. The commitment of HMG to the Joint Declaration requires an ability to exert a degree of effective control up to the end of the transitional period. Future British Governments will without

doubt wish to maintain the spirit and substance of that commitment - to be assured, as far as possible, that they retain the means to fulfil it, and to be able to demonstrate to the Chinese Government

that this is the case. Whilst the HKG intends to expand the RHKP to take over the garrison's IS and anti-illegal immigrant (II) tasks well before 1997, the FCO judges it unlikely that British Ministers would permit the garrison to be run down below a level at which it was no longer credible or able to act effectively in support of the HKG. There may well also be practical reasons why Ministers would wish to have military units available to

support the Police in a period when the Police will still be acustoming themselves to increased responsibilities in conditions where morale could be subject to considerable pressures. It is acknowledged that the use of military forces against civilians in the final years approaching handover would be increasingly hazardous and politically unpalatable. Nevertheless, the employment of such forces is considered preferable to the total breakdown.

of law and order and the consequential risk of pre-emptive Chinese

13 UK EYES A

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