LOCSEN
SECRET UK EYES A
Pacifi region, although these activities are not directly
pelated to their role in Hong Kong-
HONG KONG MARINE POLICE EXPANSION
55. The MARPOL expansion plan requires the purchase of 2 new sector command (SC) vessels in 1987 and 3 more by 1991.
MARPOL do not propose to purchase the RN PC for this purpose but have not yet announced the type of vessel they intend to acquire, although HKG intend that they will be capable of carrying out all the tasks within Hong Kong waters currently undertaken by the RN PC. The HKG intend to provide a Rescue Coordination capability with fixed wing aircraft, helicopters, and SC vessels. In some respects, this is a lesser S&R capability
than that currently provided, but it will achieve the level of
capability expected of HMG and HKG by international co-ordinating
bodies.
1
FUTURE OF THE HONG KONG PATROL CRAFT
56.
The retention of the PC in Hong Kong as an additional manifestation of HMG's commitment to the sovereignty of Hong
Kong, or to the maintenance of stability and reassurance of
the commercial sector, is not seen by either HMG or HKG as carrying the same politically symbolic weight as does the retention of ground forces Although the presence of the
White Ensign may be desirable from the military point of view,
it may not be possible to justify the retention of the PC throughout the whole rundown period, at a cost to the HKG, on that basis alone.
57. The present force level of 5 PC was agreed between HMG and HKG when there was a clearly defined external threat to Hong Kong; this threat is assessed as inconceivable under present
circumstances. Retention of the PC on a cost sharing basis
is only realistie once MARPOL have assumed the RNIS anti II
Pole if HKG is prepared to contribute to the oost of signalling Sovereignty in Hong Kong waters and to petaining a mere ef
S&R capability than iç currently planned. A force of 3 PC
27
UK EYES A
SECRET
tive
འ༢ཀ
༼ཀ༽
+
!
MRADAANDA
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.