TNAG-1626-FCO40-2240-Relations-between-Hong-Kong-and-Macau-1987 — Page 122

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04 MAR 1987

INFO TELELETTER PEKING, LISBON

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FROM:

FOLLOWING FOR:

COPIED TO:

R.N. PEIRCE, DPA, HONG KONG T.W.M. SMITH, ESQ. HKD

C.O. PIGOTT, ESQ., PEKING D.C. MARTIN, ESQ., LISBON

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MACAU NEGOTIATIONS.

1. RECENT MEDIA REPORTS (AFP, DATELINED LISBON) HAVE CLAIMED THAT THE GOVERNOR OF MACAU WILL RESIGN AFTER SIGNATURE OF THE MACAU AGREEMENT, THAT VITORINO HAS ASKED TO RETURN TO LISBON TO HELP

DRAFT ''A CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW FOR PRESENTATION TO PARLIAMENT IN OCTOBER' '', AND THAT THE PORTUGUESE PRIME MINISTER WILL VISIT PEKING IN MARCH OR, IN THE LATEST REPORT, JUNE.

2. WE WERE MOST GRATEFUL FOR LISBON TELNO 35 TO YOU, AND WOULD WELCOME ANY FURTHER REPORTING THAT COPY ADDRESSEES CAN PROVIDE.

WE WELL UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULTIES OF GETTING DECENT BRIEFINGS FROM THE PROTUGUESE. WE HAVE DRAWN A COMPLETE BLANK WITH THE ELUSIVE AND ECCENTRIC CONSUL GENERAL HERE, WHO SPEAKS (WHEN ONE CAN FIND HIM) AS THOUGH HE WERE NOT PART OF THE NEGOTIATING TEAM BUT MEBELY. AN OBSERVER. BUT THE DEMAND TO KNOW MORE ABOUT THE TALKS IS GROWING HERE, BOTH WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND AMONG UNOFFICIALS.

3. LOOKING AHEAD, THE MANAGEMENT OF THE TRANSITION IN MACAU SEEMS LIKELY TO BE MORE TROUBLESOME, AND THEREFORE EVEN MORE INTERESTING TO US, THAN THE NEGOTIATION OF THE AGREEMENT. LOCALIZATION OF. THE ADMINISTRATION, WHERE CURRENTLY THERE ARE NO SENIOR CHINESE CIVIL SERVANTS AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT IS PORTUGUESE, BY 1999 IS SURELY AN IMPOSSIBLY TALL ORDER. THERE ARE, I BELIEVE,

FEW IF ANY CHINESE LAWYERS IN MACAU. AND IN MANY OTHER RESPECTS

MACAU'S SYSTEMS ARE MORE VULNERABLE THAN THOSE OF HONG KONG.

SERIOUS PROBLEMS THERE OVER THE NEXT DECADE COULD WELL AFFECT CONFIDENCE HERE, ESPECIALLY IF THEY COINCIDED WITH AND WERE

PERCEIVED TO BE IN SOME WAY RELEVANT TO DIFFICULTIES HERE.

4. WE SHALL THEREFORE NEED TO FIND WAYS OF KEEPING OURSELVES BETTER

INFORMED ABOUT MACAU THAN WE CURRENTLY ARE. ONCE THE AGREEMENT

! SIGNED, SOME OF THE INHIBITIONS DESCRIBED IN OUR TELNO: 4154 OF

16 DECEMBER 1986 WILL BE REDUCED. WE SHALL FEEL EASIER ABOUT DIRECT

CONTACTS WITH MACAU OFFICIALS, ALTHOUGH WE SHALL STILL NEED TO

GUARD AGAINST POSSIBLE CHINESE SUSPICIONS OF CONSPIRACY OR

MEDDLING. BUT IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT WE SHALL WISH TO HAVE CHANNELS

AVAILABLE IN LISBON AND PEKING AS WELL. IT IS PROBABLY NOT TOO

SOON TO START THINKING HOW OUR PRESENT LINKS CAN BE IMPROVED.

5. DICK CLIFT HAS IT IN MIND TO VISIT MACAU BEFORE TOO LONG, AND WOULD EXPECT TO PAY A COURTESY CALL ON VITORING, AND PERHAPS ALSO THE GOVERNOR AND MONJARDINO. REGULAR CONTACT WITH VITORINO, AS SUGGESTED BY THE PORTUGUESE (LISBON TELNO. 35) COULD WELL BE

USEFUL. WE SHALL HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF THIS WHEN DICK HAS MET HIM.

SIGNED R.N. PEIRCE.

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