TNAG-1625-FCO40-2239-Relations-between-Hong-Kong-and-China-1987 — Page 91

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AS AN ANA

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But from outside it is possible to distinguish three main circles. or layers of operation in their policy: action in relation to the

table" set of relationships among world powers; the treatment of regional problems in east, south-east, and south Asia; and the handling of regional problems which do not have their existence on or near to China's frontiers.

already

13. The Chinese/belong at the top table in their own and most others' estimation. China is a Permanent Member of the Security. Council. China is a nuclear weapons state. China's GNP is now some $300 billion and by the end of the century could be $500 billion (at 1987 prices), putting China among the top 4 or 5 of the world's economic powers.

China's aims at this level were recently summed up by an analyst at the State Council as follows: "China will not accept the hegemony of others while building up her strength, and will not impose hegemony on others when she is strong". China's ideal outcome would in fact probably be a peaceful multi-polar world where she could be in control of her regional destiny and also enjoy great influence as a world power. The main barrier she sees to progress in this direction is the geo- strategic threat posed by the Soviet Union. Hence the stress which today's Chinese leaders, and Deng Xiaoping in particular, have laid on halting and driving back Soviet strategic advances in Asia (this, I believe, is what the "three obstacles" to the "normalisation" of Sino-Soviet relations are really about) and on extracting equal treatment from their Soviet opposite numbers. These are the true bones of contention in Sino-Soviet relations today: these bones are not ideology and certainly not economics, where parallels in the reform process have brought more harmony between Moscow and Peking than for a long time past.

a threat, remain such a

14. While Soviet ambitions, perceived as a threat large preoccupation, China will see the strength of the United States and the super-power stalemate it imposes as a partial good or at worst a necessary evil. But China would not contemplate doing anything to risk dependence on the United States for the sake of defence against the Soviet Union. The Chinese are as keen to enforce recognition of their own claims and standing in Washington as they are in Moscow, which is why issues like Taiwan and Tibet have such continuing prominence in Sino-American relations. They will also do what they can, within the limits of the present two- bloc system, to lay the groundwork for future multi-polarity by encouraging thoughts of regional independence in Eastern Europe and Western Europe alike and by strengthening their own ties with both parts of the European continent.

15.

They

Though late converts to the notion that a lower rather than a higher degree of tension between the super-powers could suit them, the Chinese now appreciate that relaxation may be the fastest way to promote the emergence and free play of medium-sized powers, and they certainly would not want any peace-threatening increase in tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. would be happy to see strategic stand-off maintained at a lower level of forces; and they have already shown readiness to make unilateral cuts in their own armed forces. But lacking the Soviet Union's special reasons to seek codification of the post- war status quo they can see little attraction in negotiated, statutory disarmament or "regional security" regimes which would merely limit their own flexibility and close off options for future rearmament. This applies particularly to China's nuclear capability, which is treasured as much for its political value as for its (possibly quite limited) military worth.

While offering

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