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(d) Gulf
Both sides reiterated their support for UN SCR 598, but the French do not seem to have pressed the Chinese on moving on to discuss enforcement measures. Chinese arms supplies to Iran were mentioned very briefly. Pérol was due to talk more about this with Zhou Nan but did not find time to do so.
3.
Blanchemaison said that Zhou Nan raised two extra points:
(a) Tibet
Zhou linked the recent troubles in Lhasa with the Dalai Lama's visit to the US and to statements by the US Congress. He warned that emissaries of the Dalai Lama were likely to visit Europe soon and might also cause mischief. Blanchemaison said that the French reassured the Chinese that France fully accepted that Tibet was an integral part of the People's Republic of China and that when the Dalai Lama had visited France it was purely in his capacity as a religious leader. This struck me as even more craven than our own new position, presumably dictated by Hong Kong considerations (FCO spokesman of 6 October: «the recent disturbances in Tibet are an internal affair of the PRC»), so I took the opportunity to ask whether the French had, in connection either with Tibet or with China, drawn to their guests' attention France's attachment to the cause of human rights. Blanchemaison said that not; France's position was too well known to need repeating.
(b)
Taiwan
Zhou referred to forthcoming visits to Europe by Taiwan delegations, emphasised that Peking did not object to European commercial contacts with Taiwan but warned against any acts which might seem to give governmental recognition to the Nationalist authorities. Blanchemaison took this to mean that Peking accepted the current arrangements for unofficial contacts but would oppose any new development of political/official contacts with Nationalist «Ministers» or officials.
4.
I asked whether the visit had enabled the French to judge more clearly where Qiao Shi stood on the reformist/conservative, Hu Qili/Li Peng spectrum. Blanchemaison said that not. Qiao had tagged along with Li Xiannian and not asked for any separate programme or talks. (He observed that Qiao's responsibilities in China were analogous with those of the French Interior and Justice Ministers, which one or two Community colleagues found droll.) He had seemed confident, powerful and at ease. But there had been no opportunity to assess his political tendencies.
On the financial protocol, Blanchemaison said that the projects concerned were as listed in our telegram. Suggestions that it was for the Shanghai underground railway were wide off the mark: this was a project for the distant future, and there
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