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3.
There was a general feeling
as suggested in the briefing - that the granting of emigrant visas was not reflected in an equal amount of actual emigrations. Many Hong Kong people, once they had established a right of residence elsewhere, returned to Hong Kong. One person suggested that they would be likely to leave Hong Kong at the moment of change-over in 1997, in case the PRC imposed immediate restrictions, but others thought this unlikely.
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But
4. I was asked whether I thought that our political interests in Hong Kong outweighed our trading interests. said that both were important and any answer I gave should not be interpreted as implying a lack of importance of our trading activities, which in my opinion contributed more to our invisible earnings than the published trading statistics suggested. (Others endorsed this point, quoting as an example sales of aero engines to Cathay Pacific which showed up as exports to the US rather than Hong Kong.) I thought that our top priority must be to bring the agreement with the PRC over the transition in 1997 to a satisfactory conclusion. This view again appeared to be accepted round the table, but Henry Keswick, in particular, stressed the importance of the UK establishing in good time machinery to look after its trade interests after 1997 - eg a Trade Commissioner. He argued in favour of positive discrimination to ensure that British firms were well established in Hong Kong before 1997, but John Swire said that such discrimination would be contrary to the interests of Hong Kong as a free trading community.
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and the list I
In general, everyone present at the lunch was given in advance did not correspond with those present - seemed very cheerful about Hong Kong's prospects.
CONFIDENTIAL
Your
Robin
ever,
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