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(iv)
for such a development it would be best if they were not introduced in 1988. We might set a future date for their
introduction or leave this for subsequent decision. Such an
outcome might, depending on the balance and strength of opinions expressed, be politically tenable in Hong Kong, given the tendency of the Hong Kong people to seek compromise and
avoid confrontation. But there are clearly the same dangers to the credibility and authority of HMG and the Hong Kong
Government. The prospect of a direct clash with the Chinese
would be reduced. It would however still be necessary to orchestrate with them, in advance, some form of parallel
conclusion within the BLDC so as to avoid any impression that
we were forcing its hand.
We might conclude that Hong Kong opinion clearly favoured the introduction in 1988 of a small directly elected element in LEGCO. (Our interest would probably be in going for the smallest possible number of seats consistent with public
demand.) In that case
In that case we would have to persuade the Chinese to go along with such a conclusion in the White paper. Again
this would probably involve a statement of intent by the Chinese Government and/or the BLDC which would make clear that
post-1997 arrangements would be compatible wit those which we
envisaged for LEGCO in 1988. There would have to be an
assumption on both the British and Chinese sides that any subsequent changes would need to fall within the parameters of
the Basic Law, once these had been fully established. It is
not inconceivable that such an outcome could be achieved, but
it would be difficult. It is likely that personal discussion
between the Secretary of State and Wu Xuegian would be
necessary to secure it.
26.
(i)
It is recommended that:
we adopt the "limited delay" option for the timing of the review, and aim to publish the Green Paper at the Latest at the end of May 1987, and the White Paper in January or
February 1988 (para 16 above);
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