TNAG-1597-FCO40-2182-Hong-Kong-1987-Review-of-Representative-Government-1987 — Page 119

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result in serious and lasting damage to confidence there.

Accordingly Ministers agreed that the new Governor, in response to

any press questions, should say that he knew of no reason for any

change in the present general timetable for production of the Green Paper. He did not in the event have to use that foostoon, but he

did state that the Review would go ahead as planned.

16. Limited delay as described in para 14 above would bring us some

tactical advantage. It may permit a better relationship between the

review process and the drafting of the Basic Law. Chinese

suspicions would not be greatly reduced, but we would have a little

more time to explain our intentions to the Chinese and a slightly greater margin of manoeuvre. Publication of the Green Paper at the

end of May would meet our tactical needs, while being consistent

with all earlier public statements. For publication of the White

Paper we could best aim for February, to give us maximum

manoeuvrability.

CONTACTS WITH THE CHINESE

17.

It

During 1987 it will be vital to maintain the closest possible

dialogue with the Chinese over the issues raised by the Review.

will be necessary:

(i) to reassure them of our intentions in conducting the Review;

(ii)

to explain to them in advance what issues it will have to

cover, and how Hong Kong opinion is likely to express itself

on each;

(iii) to describe the scope and general content of the Green and

White Papers;

(iv)

(v)

to give them advance notice of the texts;

in particular to explain what proposals we decide we have to

make in the White Paper, including possibly proposals on

direct elections;

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