TNAG-1596-FCO40-2181-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-1988 — Page 91

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TO PRIORITY HONG KONG

TELNO 2017

OF 231150Z JULY 87

INFO ROUTINE PEKING

30 JUL 1987

FCO TELNO 2009: STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT: LONGER TERM ISSUES

1.

IN PARA 3 OF TUR WE REFERRED BRIEFLY TO THE DIFFICULTY WE

ENVISAGE WITH EXCO'S PRINCIPLE (B) IN PARA 1 OF YOUR TELNO 2836.

IT MAY BE HELPFUL IF WE ELABORATE ON THIS POINT AND EXPLAIN THE

ONLY MEANS BY WHICH WE BELIEVE IT CAN BE OVERCOME.

2.

TRILOGY I SUGGESTED THAT THE GEC SHOULD INCLUDE MEMBERS

OF LEGCO AND EXCO. LEAVING ASIDE EXCO FOR THE MOMENT, IF AS YOUR

TELNO 2836 ENVISAGES, THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE IS ELECTED BY THE GEC

(NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) BEFORE A NEW LEGISLATURE IS ELECTED, THE

GEC WILL INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE WHICH HAS ALREADY

BEEN DISSOLVED. THIS WOULD SEEM TO BE INAPPROPRIATE, AND, IF

DISSOLUTION WERE THE RESULT OF A DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN CE AND

WOULD LOAD THE DICE AGAINST THE CE.

LEGCO,

3.

ON THE OTHER HAND UNDER THE SYSTEM ENVISAGED THE GEC

WOULD ALSO HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN HELPING TO ELECT THE

LEGISLATURE, BY MEANS OF VALIDATING THE ELECTION OF

OFFICIAL/APPOINTED MEMBERS: A FULL LEGISLATURE CANNOT BE ELECT ED

UNTIL THE GEC HAS BEEN CONVENED. THIS HOWEVER IS OF NO

SIGNIFICANCE SINCE IT WOULD BE HIGHLY INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE CE'S

NOMINEES TO BE PART OF THE BODY WHICH ELECTS HIM. FOR THE SAME

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