TNAG-1596-FCO40-2181-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-1988 — Page 180

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

GRS 1250

SECRET

FM HONG KONG

TO DESKSY 16120OZ FCO

TELNO 2781

OF 16093OZ JULY 87

INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING

1

SECRET

нив

RECEIVES

onli

30 JUL 1937

A

MY TELNOS 2728-2732, YOUR TELNOS 1945-1946 AND PEKING TELNO 1292 : STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT :

LONGER TERM ISSUES

THANKYOU FOR THE COMMENTS IN TURS. YOUR SUBSTANTIVE POINT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TERMS OF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

AND THE LEGISLATURE HAS CONTINUED TO CAUSE US SOME CONCERN. WE AGREE

THAT THE FORMULATION IN PARAGRAPH 15 OF MY TELNO 2732 WAS NOT

ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY. BUT AS YOU POINT OUT, THIS IS A POINT OF

DETAIL AND WE DO NOT HAVE TO PRODUCE AN ELABORATE SCHEME ON THESE

POINTS.

2. WE CLEARLY DO NOT HAVE TIME TO CONSULT EXCO ONCE AGAIN ON THIS

ISSUE. THE BEST COURSE SEEMS THERFORE TO BE TO INCLUDED THE ADVANTA-

GES AND DISADVANTAGES OF TWO OPTIONS, 1E:

(1) FOR THE TERMS OF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND THE

LEGISLATURE TO COINCIDE EXACTLY: OR

(11) FOR ELECTIONS TO THE LEGISLATURE TO BE STAGGERED.

DUE TO THE LIMITED TIME AVAILABLE, WE HAVE BEEN OBLIGED TO TRY AND

KEEP THE CONSEQUENTIAL DRAFTING CHANGES TO A MINIMUM, BUT HOPE THEY

ARE SUFFICIENT TO MAKE THE OPTIONS COMPREHENSIBLE.

3. ON THE PAPER ON THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE (MY TELNO 2730 REFERS), WE SUGGEST THAT FARAGRAPH 23 SHOULD BE BROKEN INTO TWO PARAGRAPHS AND

RE-DRAFTED AS FOLLOWS :

23. AGAIN, HOWEVER, IT WOULD SEEM ADVISABLE FOR THE BASIC LAW TO PROVIDE FOR APPROPRIATE BALANCES TO THE POWER OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE IN THIS REGARD. THESE MIGHT INCLUDE, AS NOW, A PROVISION

FOR FRESH ELECTIONS TO THE LEGISLATURE TO BE HELD WITHIN A SPECIFIED

TIME LIMIT FOLLOWING DISSOLUTION. THEY MIGHT ALSO INCLUDE A

PROVISION THAT THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE SHOULD ALSO BE REQUIRED TO SEEK RE-ELECTION IF THE LEGISLATURE IS DISSOLVED. SUCH A SYSTEM WOULD

TEND TO ENSURE THAT THE POWER OF DISSOLUTION WAS ONLY EXERCISED BY

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE WHEN ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. ON THE OTHER HAND IT

MIGHT PLACE TOO MUCH POWER IN THE HANDS OF AN OBSTRUCTIVE LEGISLATURE

BY ENABLING IT TO FORCE A DISSOLUTION AS A MEANS OF REMOVING THE

CHIEF EXECUTIVE.

SECRET

میرم

43,

Page 180Page 181

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