TNAG-1587-FCO40-2171-Future-of-Hong-Kong-British-Consulate-General-1986 — Page 83

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CONFIDENTIAL

We will therefore have to approach the Chinese about the provision of offices for a Consulate-General and associated residential accommodation, with a view to obtaining their consent to treating the Foreign Secretary's title to such properties as an exception to the rules which apply to the succession of State property. Subject to Richard Evans's views, it seems to us that suitable opportunity for a first approach might be in contacts between the Secretary of State and Wu Xuegian in the margins of the State Visit to China next. year. We would then follow this up, either through direct bilateral contacts in Peking or through the Joint Liaison Group.

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Before we approach the Chinese we need to be clear in our own minds exactly what we want. We have looked carefully at the suggestion that the site and buildings of HMS Tamar might be suitable. We can see some advantages, including its central position, but there are the following drawbacks:

a)

b)

c)

The Chinese would be unlikely to agree to our using the buildings, both because of their military connotations which they would probably consider a symbol of "imperialism", and also because they might want to use Tamar themselves for part of the PLA garrison after 1 July 1997.

Even if the Chinese were to agree to our using these buildings, we are not sure that we would be wise to do so. The military connotations of HMS Tamar would have a lingering effect after 1997. Ranging as they do around the military docks, they would be a prominent, and by that time probably disadvantageous, reminder of the former British

military presence.

The buildings are probably too big, even for the large number of staff we shall need after 1997 (see paragraph 6 below). Furthermore, we would not wish to take part of the site (for example, one building) since this would create security problems if the PLA garrison were to be housed nearby.

CONFIDENTIAL