9787/82
The Court continued:
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...
"This type of detention would no longer be in conformity with the Convention if it ceased to be based on reasons that are plausible and consistent with the objectives of the Social Protection Act; for the purposes of Article 5, it would become "unlawful". It follows that the individual concerned must be entitled to apply to a "court" having jurisdiction to determine whether or not there has been a violation of that kind; this possibility must be open to him during the course of his detention - once a certain period has elapsed since the detention began and thereafter at reasonable intervals (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned X v. the United Kingdom judgment, Series A no. 46, pp. 22-25, para. 52) and also at the moment of any return to detention after being at liberty.
It is true that Article 5 para. 4 does not guarantee a right to judicial control of such scope as to empower the court, on all aspects of the case, including questions of pure expediency, to substitute its own discretion for that of the decision-making authority. The review should, however, be wide enough to bear on those conditions which, under the Convention, are essential for the "lawful" detention of a person pursuant to chapter VII of the 1964 Act; this is all the more so because, with the exception of the status of recidivist or habitual offender itself, the conditions initially justifying that detention may change to such an extent that they cease to exist
(ibid.).
...
89. In the light of these principles the applicant, in the instant case, should have been able to avail himself of an appropriate procedure allowing a court to examine whether his behavioural problems still persisted and whether the Home Secretary was entitled to think that continued detention was necessary in the interests of public safety.
90.
In this regard, the Government submit, by way of an alternative plea, that it was open to the applicant to initiate habeas corpus. proceedings or to seek judicial review by the courts either of the Home Secretary's decision to revoke the life licence or of his continued detention. In addition they contend that the Parole Board, In the exercise of its functions under the Criminal Justice Act 1967, enjoys the necessary independence and procedural guarantees to be considered as a court.
91.
The applicant, on the other hand, disputes that the Parole Board can be regarded as a court because of a lack of procedural guarantees and contends that under English law a prisoner convicted of a life sentence could not obtain judicial review of his detention or challenge a decision to revoke his licence.
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