TNAG-1585-FCO40-2159-Hong-Kong-prisons-and-prisoners-1986 — Page 49

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77. As far as the execution of the sentence is concerned it is the duty of the Home Secretary to decide whether to revoke a life licence taking into consideration the past history of the applicant and assessing whether his present behaviour puts the public at risk. The fact that the judge, at the trial concerning the events which led to the applicant's recall, hinted that the applicants liberty be restored does not, in the Commission's view, show that the decision of the Home Secretary several months previously was either unreasonable or abitrary. Indeed Judge Streeter explicitly recognised that such decisions fell within the province of the Home Secretary and left the matter entirely in his hands (see para. 34).

78. It is clear from the incidents which had occurred in prison prior to his release in 1977 that the applicant had a violent disposition which erupted from time to time, particularly when he drank heavily. After his conviction for minor offences he was specifically warned by the Home Office in a letter dated 19 April 1977 that his licence could be revoked by the Home Secretary if his behaviour continued to give cause for concern. The decision by the Home Secretary to revoke his licence and recall him was finally prompted by his unstable and disturbed behaviour in late June 1977 when he fired an air pistol and, while in a violent and agitated mood, attempted to hang himself in police custody (see above, paras. 31-33).

79. As the Commission has previously explained (see para. 71), the Convention does not require that the execution or supervision of sentences be entrusted to a court. The Commission considers that the above facts evidence a sufficient connection with his original conviction, having regard to the discretion that must be left to the executive in such matters, to give rise to an apprehension that he might be a risk to the public if left at large and that the applicants re-detention in June 1977 cannot be described as unreasonable or arbitrary in the circumstances. It follows, therefore, that the applicant's re-detention was based on his original conviction within the meaning of Art. 5(1)(a).

80.

Conclusion

The Commission concludes by ten votes to one, that there has been no breach of Art. 5(1).

As regards Article 5(4)

81. The applicant also complains that, when he was re-detained after fifteen months of liberty, he was unable to take any proceedings satisfying the requirements of Art. 5 (4), which reads:

"Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.'

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