TNAG-1584-FCO40-2158-Localisation-of-the-Hong-Kong-police-force-1986 — Page 23

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Redacted under FOI Exemption S 27(1),

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FM HONG KONG

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY

03 JAN 1986

TO DESKBY 02110OZ FCO

TELNO 8

OF 02091OZ JANUARY 86

DESK OFFICER

INDEX

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INFO DESKBY 03070OZ PEKING

YOUR TELNO 2034 : FUTURE OF THE HONG KONG POLICE AND

GARRISON REPLACEMENT.

WE ARE APPROACHING A SERIES OF INTER-REALTED DECISIONS IN

THIS AREA. THEY WILL NEED TO BE COMMUNICATED TO THE CHINESE. THIS

SHOULD BE DONE IN A WAY WHICH ATTRACTS MAXIMUM POLITICAL BENEFIT.

SEEN FROM HERE, AT THE NECESSARY DECISIONS CAN BE TAKEN IN TIME,

A GOOD MOMENT WOULD BE DURING THE MINISTER OF STATE'S FORTHCOMING

WISHT TO PEKING.

2. THERE ARE THREE POINTS WE SHALL WANT TO GET ACROSS: FIRST HMG'S

DECISION (ASSUMING THAT THIS IS THE LINE ACCEPTED BY MINISTERS)

NOT TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE: SECOND OUR DECISION

TO EXPAND THE POLICE FORCE INSTEAD: AND THIRD OUR DECISION TO

STRENGTHEN THE LOCAL OFFICER CADRE MEANWHILE.

3. THE FIRST POINT IS IMPORTANT, AND FITS THE MINISTERIAL VISIT. HT MEETS A MAJOR CHINESE CONCERN. IT WOULD HELP TO RESTORE THE

CONFIDENCE OF THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP IN OUR HANDLING OF HONG

KONG AFFAIRS, WHICH IMAGINE WILL BE ONE OF MR. RENTON'S AIMS.

THE CHINESE HAVE LONG SUSPECTED OUR AIMS IN THE SECURITY FIELD.

THEY ARE HAUNTED ON THE ONE HAND BY THE FEAR THAT HMG MAY YET CUT

AND RUN, LEAVING A SECURITY MESS BEHIND: ON THE OTHER THE FEAR

THAT WE WILL BUILD UP A LOCAL FORCE IN A BAD TO FREEZE OUT THE PLA.

4. IF MINISTERS ACCEPT OUR LOCAL VIEW THAT WE MUST EXCLUDE THE

OPTION OF AN INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE, THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE

IN TELLING THE CHINESE SOON, WHILE WE CAN STILL EXTRACT POLITICAL

BENEFIT. IF WE WANT, WE WILL BE PUSHED, AND BE SEEN TO BE PUSHED. ASSUMING THAT EXCO ADVICE ON THE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE ON 7

JANUARY, FOLLOWS THE LINE WE ARE PROPOSING, THE QUESTION WH

WILL THEN BE WHETHER IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO PROCESS THE OUTCOME

AND SECURE THE AGREEMENT OF MINISTERS IN THE SUBSEQUENT TEN DAYS, ENABLING MR. RENTON TO RAISE THE SUBJECT IN PEKING.

5. IN REASSURING THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT ON A POINT OF MAJOR

*IMPORTANCE TO THEM, WE MUST TRY TO SECURE THE BEST POSSIBLE WIND

FOR OUR OWN OBJECTIVES, 1.E. EXPANSION AND FURTHER LOCALISATION

OF THE ORYAL HONG KONG POLICE BEFORE 1997. EXPANSION SHOULD COME

AS NO SURPRISE TO PEKING.

WE NEED NOT GO BEYOND

A GENERAL STATEMENT OF OUR PLANS AT THIS STAGE. BUT THE DISCUSSIONS

IN EXCO (ALSO SCHEDULED FOR 7 JANUARY) SHOULD PROVIDE THE BASIS

FOR A GENERAL INDICATION BY MR RENTON OF WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND.

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