TNAG-1553-FCO40-2117-Hong-Kong-Control-of-Publications-Consolidation-Ordinance-19-1986 — Page 219

D

CONFIDENTIAL

because it may

against repeal

reaction. Peking's view

perhaps be unhappy about

would find it difficult

could use convincingly to

either to Us ог to Hong

therefore that the Chinese would be likely actually to

object particularly as special powers could in any event

be needed after 1997. The prime argument

i s the prospect of an adverse Chinese

i s that while the Chinese would

repeal of the Ordinance, they

to produce reasons which they

justify opposition to repeal,

Kong opinion. Peking doubt

-

be taken if conditions so required.

9.

I share Peking's assessment. On the basis that the

Chinese would find it difficult to object to such a move,

the question arises of whether we should take the

initiative by informing them in advance, in a

low key way, of what we intend. Peking favour such an approach. My instinct is rather against it because:

(a)

an approach by US would

tend to indicate to the

Chinese both that we see a locus for them in this

matter and that we think

them. This may

encourage

it may be difficult for

them to argue privately

with us against a change to the law which they

might find difficult

initiative in

to do if we had not tak en the

raising i t wi th them.

It is

find it

certainly not a subject that they would

easy to attack US ОП via their traditional of a campaign in Hong Kong's leftwing press;

tactic

(b)

the Chinese would be obliged to take a view matter which they might find easier to ignore;

on

(c)

co

a

an approach would also suggest to the Chinese that

we recognise that they have a droit de regard over

all changes in the legal system in Hong Kong

between now and 1997. Annex I to the Joint

Declaration provides that "after the establishment

of the Hong Kong Special Administrative region, the

I aws

previously in force in Hong Kong (ie the

CONFIDENTIAL