TNAG-1541-FCO40-2105-Further-resettlement-of-Vietnamese-refugees-from-Hong-Kong-i-1986 — Page 14

The above estimates cannot readily be compared with those given in memorandum XCC(82)54, which were for establishing a closed camp for 5,000 refugees on a new site. Chi Man Wan is an existing institution, and the staff costs and all but $2.9 million of the capital costs will be incurred in any case if it remains in use. The capital cost of constructing a closed camp at Hei Ling Chau is much higher at $48 million than the $12.6 million forecast in memorandum XCC(82)54, although its capacity is only 2,500. The main extra costs are for site formation ($7.6 million), semi-permanent buildings ($19.3 million), and provision of water supply ($4 million). The space entitle- ment per refugee has been increased, in recognition of the tensions likely to build up in a closed camp. There are addi- tional recurrent costs for supporting staff of Correctional Services and other departments which were not included before. Food costs have also been revised.

C

D

Deterrent Effect

33

The nub of the issue is whether the establishment of closed camps in Hong Kong will deter people from leaving Vietnam. This is difficult to say at this stage, but it is generally felt that it would have some deterrent effect. If this is correct, then the expenditure envisaged would be justified. If not, much resources would have been put in and some international criticism attracted without achieving useful results, and at the end of the day Hong Kong could be faced with the problem of what to do with the refugees held in closed camps without hope of resettlement. But even if the deterrent effect of this policy is uncertain, the change of policy may still be justified on the following grounds

(a)

(b)

the U.S., which is the main resettlement

country for Vietnamese refugees from Hong Kong has been continuously pressing for the adoption of a form of "humane deterrence" to discourage more refugees from coming out of Vietnam. If something positive is not done in Hong Kong to demonstrate our resolve, the U.S. may be less inclined to accept more refugees from Hong Kong in future. At Annex C is a list showing the inflow and outflow of Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong and the region since 1979, and the countries in which Hong Kong refugees have been resettled. A graph showing the movement of the Vietnamese refugee population in Hong Kong since 1980 with a projection to December 1982 is at Annex D;

་་

this policy only brings Hong Kong into line with the rest of the region; I UGLA

CONFIDENTIAL