CONFIDENTIAL
THE PRESENT TIME INDICATES THAT THE TWO MAIN REASONS FOR THEM LEAVING VIETNAM FOR HONG KONG ARE FIRST ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES IN NORTH VIETNAM, SECOND, THERE IS A SHORTAGE OF MEDIUM-SIZED BOATS AND THE REFUGEES ARE HAVING TO USE SMALL BOATS WITH THE RESULT THAT THEY HAVE TO TAKE A COURSE WHICH IS CLOSE TO A COASTLINE. THE STAFF OF THE U.S. CONSULATE GENERAL ADDED THAT ANOTHER FACTOR IN THEIR EXPERIENCE WAS THE STANDARD OF THE CONDITIONS AND FACILITIES IN HONG KONG'S CAMPS. THE REFUGEES THOUGHT THAT THEY HAD LITTLE TO LOSE IN COMING TO HONG KONG EVEN IF THE PROSPECTS OF RESETTLEMENT WERE NOT (NOT) GREAT.
6. WE ARE NOW STRONGLY OF THE VIEW THAT RESETTLEMENT ALONE CAN NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED AS A REALISTIC ANSWER AS FAR AS 1987 IS CONCERNED. THE UNHCR'S FIRST THOUGHTS (PARA. 4 OF UKMIS TUR) ARE EQUALLY UNREALISTIC. SUBJECT TO HANOI'S CONFIRMATION, WE VERY MUCH DOUBT THAT THE WIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO POLICE ITS COASTLINE TO PREVENT ILLEGAL DEPARTURES.
7. WE ARE NOW SURE THAT THE ONLY VIABLE OPTION IS TO TACKLE THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH A VIEW TO COMING TO SOME ARRANGEMENT ON INVOLUNTARY REPATRIATION. AS WE SAID IN OUR TUR, EVEN IF YOU DO NOT (NOT) SUCCEED IN ACHIEVING A REASONABLE RESPONSE, AT LEAST WE WILL HAVE A CARD TO PLAY WITH THE RESETTLEMENT COUNTRIES. WE SHOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ARGUE STRONGLY TO THIS END IN YOUR SUBMISSION TO MINISTERS (YOUR TEL 1346).
AKERS-JONES
LIMITED
HKD
SEAD
UND
MR. WILSON
CONFIDENTIAL
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