TNAG-1536-FCO40-2100-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-resettlement-in-third-countri-1986 — Page 33

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What

exactly.

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the more successful the resettlement and local integration programmes, the more likely the arrival of further refugees.

5. We discussed "durable solutions" for the Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong. Mr Issaka agreed that resettlement (in a third country) would not solve the whole problem, although of course UNHCR would keep up the pressure to get as many resettled as possible. He felt local integration within the region (ie in first asylum countries) should be explored more. Indeed, this is in line with the High Commissioner's provisional thinking, but is going to be difficult to put across to such countries as Thailand who have, to date, (with minor exceptions) categorically refused to accept Vietnamese refugees under "local integration". Local integration also may not always be popular with the refugees themselves: as only 28 refugees to date had accepted Hong Kong's offer, Mr Issaka has had to instruct UNHCR staff in Hong Kong to give an ultimatum to refugees selected for local integration in Hong Kong: they, within two months, either accept Hong Kong's offer or leave the camp. They would not be considered for resettlement elsewhere. Mr Issaka suspects either that life in the open camps with full employment locally is too agreeable or else the refugees are hoping for third country resettlement. I stressed the importance of the Hong Kong offer being seen to be effective: other resettlement countries would be watching carefully and would no doubt wish to see the Hong Kong allocation approaching full utilisation before they could make further offers.

6.

The third "durable solution" voluntary repatriation is the most difficult. Mr Issaka agreed that repatriation had to be voluntary and all concerned must be satisfied that refugees would not suffer persecution on return to Vietnam. He appreciated the efforts tit donor countries could make to help influence the Vietnamese government on this matter.

7.

We then discussed the relationship between the ODP and illegal departures. Mr Issaka thought that while some may accept the view that these represnted two separate case-loads, his personal view was that ODP delays did cause more illegal departures. Again, he felt this was an area where donor governments could help by ensuring that the ODP worked as well as possible - he expressed concern at the current US Government position and by keeping open a dialogue with the Vietnamese Government on both the ODP and on illegal departures.

COMMENT

8.

The foregoing reflects Mr Issaka's point of view, taken after his first six months as Head of Resettlement Section. His thinking follows the provisional thinking of the High Commissioner concerning local integration and donor governments' dialogues with the Vientamese and other local governments to help solve the South-East Asian refugee problem. (Please see paragraph 17 of my letter of 15 May to Stephen Nash on the Thailand Anti-Piracy Arrangement).

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