TNAG-1529-FCO40-2093-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-general-1986 — Page 21

CODE 12.77

155

HKV 243/3

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY

22 SEP 1986

DES

INDEX

Mrs Rogerson

UND

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MICER

PE

SKY

PA

POLICY EVALUATION:

1.

Action Taken

тек

Reference

Inthate

Not unreasonable

Vascell pot. Paplots 197/9

Very

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AID TO INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES IN THAILAND

Attached is a copy of a preliminary draft paper on aid to Indo-Chinese refugees and displaced persons in Thailand prepared jointly by SEAD, Mr Wheeler, the Principal Finance Officer and the JMU as part of the Whitehall-wide Policy Evaluation Exercise. will see that it is proposed, eventually, to publish this paper.

2.

You

I have fundamental reservations about the wisdom of this paper in its present form on two grounds: methodology and presentation. Miethouploy. J.

3. I have no disagreement with the ultimate objectives of UK Foreign policy as stated in paragraph 4. However, the fundamental purpose of aid to Indo-Chinese refugees is humanitarian, not political. It may, of course, have political spin-offs, but the efficiency of the programme should be judged against its fundamental purpose, not its spin-offs. Even if it is argued that the prime objective of our aid to Indo-Chinese refugees is political, it is poor methodology to judge the efficiency against overall objectives of one element of policy in isolation. The overall policy objective could only ever be achieved through simultaneous pursuance of a wide variety of elements. It is possible, when studying the elements in isolation, to say whether their cumulative effect would be additive (1 + 1 = 2), synergistic (1 + 1 = 3 or more), neutral (1 + 1 = 1) or destructive (1 + 1 = 0 or worse) and hence impossible to ascribe any given effect to that one element.

4. Therefore to state the objectives in paragraph 4 and observe the indicators in paragraph 9 is all very well, but there is absolutely no guarantee that the indicators bear any relationship to the effectiveness of this particular element of the overall strategy. For instance, (paragraph 9(b)) is it not far more likely that Thai businnessmen look favourably on British business because of its quality and competitiveness and because they have a need for our products than because we contribute approximately 2% to the costs of UNBRO? No doubt we only have an entre into the Thai market because it is not a communist country. But again, what evidence is there that our contribution to UNBRO (or even the West's contribution) has kept communism at bay? Who is to say that there would be any Cambodians in Thailand if there had not been an UNBRO? Might they not have fought more desperately if they did not have the haven of Thailand in which to seek refuge? If they had done so, might they have defeated the Vietnamese or at least have made such a nuisance of themselves that the Vietnamese chose to withdraw? And if this had happened, might we not have a pro-Western government in Phnom Penh, a new member of ASEAN and hence a stronger ASEAN? what are the opportunity costs?

So

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