10.
VII.
66.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS WITHIN THE RESCUE AT SEA PROGRAMME
The introduction of RASRO has increased the workload of UNHCR in Singapore, which coordinates submissions within the region. The introduction of a RASRO Transit Centre in Hong Kong will also increase the workload of UNHCR Hong Kong. However, both of these offices feel able to absorb these increases without need of additional manpower. The workload of both offices would be significantly reduced if governments would delegate more authority to local embassies and consulates to decide quickly on submissions made.
67.
Rescue at Sea promotion has become a major activity of the UNHCR Resettlement Officer dealing with Indochinese refugees, stationed at Headquarters.
68.
As East and Southeast Asian nations build up their fleets and perhaps develop a more flexible attitude towards rescue (there are indications that this could result if all rescued refugees were moved quickly from the country of first asylum), and as an increasing number of European owned ships switch from national flags to flags of convenience, we could expect the number of disembarkations under DISERO to increase (as we have seen, it has already increased from 7 to 17 over one year). This makes it most important that countries participating in the DISERO scheme provide guarantees to the government of the coastal state before the ship arrives in port. This is extremely difficult to do unless authority to issue guarantees is delegated to embassies in the country of disembarkation. This is most required in Singapore where 11 out of 17 DISERO disembarkations in 1985 took place (see Annex 9).
VII.
69
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As stated at the beginning of this Report, adjusted figures have no empirical reality. Use of such figures is a heuristic device which could possibly serve to construct a future algorithm to help solve the problem of comparing over time one constant, rescue activity, within a range of variables; at the present time however, use is limited to qualification of simple figures. None of the statistical annexes to this Report contain adjusted figures.
70. That there has been a significant increase in rescues over the previous year is evident in the simple figures in Annex 4. If the number of refugees in the Grand Total is adjusted to account for difference in boat size (35 per boat in 1985, 41 per boat in 1984) and for the 10% decrease in arrivals, a comparative Grand Total of 3,912 is arrived at. This figure, compared to the 2,357 rescued in 1984, shows a tremendous increase in rescue at sea activity.
71.
Perhaps the best reason to doubt that RASRO is primarily responsible for this increase is that no rescuing captain intervieweed so far has ever heard of the scheme. However, the scheme has reduced the risk of costly delays in port pending disembarkation guarantees, and this fact could have influenced the actions of some shipowners. Certain shipping lines belonging to RASRO member countries have instructed their ships to return to the conventional shipping lines between Hong Kong and Singapore (a straight line) instead of curving around refugee areas (which increased fuel costs). Perhaps the primary benefit of the scheme has been to provide a foundation on which to build international "burden-sharing” rescue at sea efforts. As stated at the beginning of the Report, it is perhaps unfair to judge RASRO after such a
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.