TNAG-1527-FCO40-2091-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-general-1986 — Page 107

(c) in the case of the resettlement country running re-orientation programmes for incoming refugees, it allows time for sufficient refugees to accumulate to make a class or simply to await such time as the welcoming facilities are free.

12.

I then asked why so few names had been forwarded to the UK for RASRO resettlement cases. Mr Cooper admittted that there had been some teething problems with the programme but felt that the longer it ran the smoother it would operate. I pointed out that RASRO was a one year experimental programme that was due to be appraised before any decision to continue with it. He feigned surprise, but said he was certain that it would continue. I pointed out that if UNHCR wanted the UK to pledge another quota for RASRO cases they would have to submit a formal request to us. We would then have to submit the request to Ministers for a decision. Far from an underfulfilment of the present quota leading to a carry-over of places into the next year, it was more likely that it would result in a reduced quota, if the decision to continue was taken.

It was therefore important for UNHCR to provide us with enough names to fill our quota for 1985/6. Mr Cooper seemed rather taken aback at this. Mr Cooper then made a half-hearted appeal for the UK to join the DISERO scheme. I held out no hope of our agreeing to join. Finally we had a brief dicussion about the problems facing the ODP, caused by the enormous back-log of applicants to the US and the disagreement between the US and the Vietnamese authorities over the number of people eligible to go to the US. This had resulted in the Vietnamese authorities refusing to allow the Americans to process any new applications until the back-log was reduced and, eventually, to them expelling the interview teams. Unfortunately this disagreement was also affecting other countries' ODP processing.

13. Mr Lyonette is a former member of the DS. As an introduction he ran through the mandate and operations of the UNHCR in a very orderly manner, explaining clearly where they had stretched the mandate and why (because no-one

I asked else was there to do the job and people would die if UNHCR did not). what he thought would be the main topics of discussion at EXCOM in the autumn. He picked out the following:

Of

(a) the inter-relationship of all the humanitarian relief organisations, particularly now that OBOA is due be dissolved this year. particular concern to UNHCR was to what extent it should get involved in local development projects to help settle refugees and make them more self-sufficient in their countries of refuge. Mr Lyonette felt that UNHCR does have a limited role to play in development but that it should be of a transitional nature (ie it should be handed over to development agencies at an early opportunity) and its approach should be integrative (ie that the local host population should benefit as well so that the refugee camps do not become an oasis of development in an undevelopped country, with all the jealousy and bitterness that would create). In this regard, he strongly praised ODA's position, and felt that there was room for improving the co-operation between UNHCR and UNDP.

(b) the budget - the question of governments pledging the full amount of the budget by agreeing to pick up a percentage of the whole might be brought up.

Mr Lyonette said that there was little support for this idea in UNHCR where it was thought not only to be naive but also potentially dangerous. At present the budget proposals are drawn up by UNHCR officials according to the needs and priorities as they, unbiased officials, assessed them.