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most of the resettlement places made available in the last few months will have been taken up. Hong Kong may again be in the same predicament as in 1983 and 1984, when the only major resettlement programmes were those of the US, Canada and Australia. These countries and others have indicated, more or less explicitly, that the level of any further offers of resettlement places is likely to be dependent upon a further offtake by the UK.
4. As you know, we consider it vital that we are seen both in Hong Kong and in Parliament to be fulfilling our obligations towards
towards the territory. Any perception that we were falling short in this regard could have serious implications for our relationship with Hong Kong and, indirectly, for confidence in the territory. Both are likely to come under increasing strain as the date of Hong Kong's restoration to China comes closer. It would do serious damage if Hong Kong opinion concluded that our commitment to the territory wa s waning and we were washing our hands of its problems.
5.
So far as the problem of Vietnamese refugees is concerned, we have kept these
these strains in check SO far through the measures set out in the Government's Reply to SCORRI. Now that we are nearing the fulfilment of these commitments to resettle more family reunion cases and to exhort friends and allies to take
take more refugees from it is time for us Hong Kong
to examine what more do to help resolve the problem of Vietnamese refugees Hong Kong.
6.
-
-
we can in
We are
Ministers here are convinced that we cannot allow our present resettlement programme to end without putting in hand further action to help Hong Kong. responsible for the territory and must take a lead in action to solve its refugee problems. No one else can, or will. In the absence of a UK commitment to further resettlement, other countries' intakes are likely to be reduced, leading to a rise in the refugee population in Hong Kong. This would also seriously increase the possibility of disturbances in the camps. The inevitable publicity any such disturbance would generate would throw our inactivity into embarrassing relief.
7.
This leads us
back to paragraph 29 in the Government' S Reply to SCORRI, cover ing Recommendation 5(iii) on
the acceptance by UK of refugees who are hard to resettle and who have spent years in camps:
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