TNAG-1524-FCO40-2088-Hong-Kong-Parliamentary-Sub-Committee-on-Race-Relations-and--1986 — Page 157

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

Tag derberty, Ph

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felt that some kind of deterrent was necessary because, although the rate at which refugees were arriving in Hong Kong had stabilised considerably since the initial influx in 1979, the rate at which refugees from Hong Kong were being accepted for resettlement overseas was falling sharply. Hong Kong was therefore faced with the prospect of the camp population rising again to the levels of 1979-80, without any prospect of a corresponding increase in resettlement. The resultant situation would rapidly have become unmanage able. Since a refusal to allow refugee boats to enter Hong Kong was and is considered unacceptable for humanitarian reasons, the closed camp policy was the most humane measure of deterrence that was available to the Hong Kong Government. There was strong public pressure in Hong Kong to introduce such a policy for several reasons: similar policies had already been adopted by other places of asylum in the region (in some cases since 1979); Hong Kong already experienced acute problems as a result of the large influx of immigrants from China in recent years and the public were alarmed at the prospect of Hong Kong giving shelter indefinitely to increasing numbers of Vietnamese; and they objected to the fact that there was an "open door" policy towards the Vietnamese while Chinese illegal immigrants, with whom they had close cultural, and often family, ties were as a matter of Government policy repatriated to China (whereas since late 1979 ethnic Vietnamese, with no cultural or other links with Hong Kong, have comprised 98 per cent of ali arrivals in the territory from Victnam). They did not see why the Vietnamese should be given special treatment, especially since to an increasing extent their primary motivation for leaving their country, like that of Chinese immigrants, seemed to be economic rather than political.

· Effectiveness of the Policy

11. In his oral evidence to the Sub-Committee, Mr Luce provided statistics of refugee arrivals for Hong Kong and for the South East Asia region as a whole which demonstrate clearly that the Hong Kong arrival rate has decreased considerably more sharply than that of the region since the introduction of the closed camp policy (Q223). In other respects Hong Kong is an attractive place for asylum seekers: it is generally recognised that the material conditions in Hong Kong's camps, including the closed camps, are better than those of most other countries of the region. Indeed it was precisely because open camp conditions were attractive that Hong Kong appears to have acted as a magnet for boat people until the closed camp policy was introduced. HMG consider that the conclusion is inescapable that the decrease in the arrival rate in Hong Kong is due to the closed camp policy.

Consequences of Abolishing the Closed Camp Policy

12. In HMG's view the reasons for continuing with the closed camp policy are the same today as when it was introduced in 1982. HMG note that the report recognises that the latter are "understandable" (Para 21). A substantial flow of refugees continues to leave Vietnam. Although the Hong Kong arrival rate has decreased more sharply than that of the region as a whole since 1982, the

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