TNAG-1507-FCO40-2065-Guangdong-nuclear-power-station-project-at-Daya-Bay-safety-c-1986 — Page 69

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7. Dr Blix asked whether there was anything more the UK could do to resolve the problem of South Africa. Could we persuade the South Africans to accept fullscope safeguards on their nuclear facilities? Mr Renton replied that he was very doubtful. The UK had done what it could in the cause of moderation and had suffered a good deal of criticism from the Commonwealth and the NNA as a result. Economic sanctions would not work. South Africa's industrial base was too developed and her coastline too long to police sanctions successfully. The UK no longer possessed sufficient leverage to persuade South Africa to change course. Had there been any further indications that South Africa was interested in joining the NPT? Dr Blix said that in his view the South Africans had no strong reasons either for or against membership of the NPT but they would probably demand access to Western nuclear technology as a reward for joining. Mr Renton thought that public antipathy to any form of nuclear cooperation with South Africa would rule this out.

8.

On other regional problems, Dr Blix said that he felt the UK, as a fellow community member, had an important role to play in persuading the Spanish to resolve their differences with the IAEA. He wondered how deeply embedded Spanish opposition to the NPT was now that they had decided to remain in NATO. Mr Renton asked whether there was any possibility of Argentina joining the NPT. Dr Blix felt this most unlikely. Their interpretation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco as permitting peaceful nuclear explosions was unacceptable. He thought that it might be possible to conclude an agreement allowing them to maintain this position but at the same time signing a separate agreement with the IAEA excluding the possibility of peaceful nuclear explosions but there was still considerable oppositon to the NPT in Argentina notably from the Peronist party. The most important thing, however, was that there should be no proliferation. greater degree of openness between Brazil and Argentina would improve the situation. Argentina may be prepared to demonstrate its enrichment techniques to the Brazilians but Brazil was keen to be accepted as the regional superpower. He thought that Brazil was "only one or two turns of the screwdriver" away from possessing nuclear weapons. Dr Blix said that the situation in the Indian sub-continent was also causing great concern. Both India and Pakistan now seemed to possess nuclear weapons and it was essential to avoid a super-power type arms race between the two. Mr Wilmshurst said that he feared that if Pakistan tested a nuclear device, India would feel obliged to follow suit and that they would be caught in a spiral of testing.

9.

Dr Blix raised the subject of a Comprehensive Test-Ban which he believed would be a positive step. He added however that President Alfonsin and Mr Gandhi might be finding their membership in the Five Continent Group somewhat awkward given their country's proximity to nuclear weapon status. Mr Renton said that our arguments against a CTB at present hinged on the difficulty of verification. Dr Blix said that he remained unconvinced by the verification argument. With the current state

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