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3.
-But
We can only steer a path between these conflicting
demands. We can demonstrate to the Chinese by all we are
doing that our objective is to provide the reassurance of
Hong Kong opinion that will enable the project to go ahead.
we should not respond to the Chinese request for a direct statement of support: if pressed we should have to
explain why this would not be helpful. Where deferral of
contract signature is concerned, Xu Jiatun has reportedly
indicated to Maria Tam and Allen Lee that a short delay
might be possible. We can reasonably tell the Chinese that
think this is a helpful step, which could avert a
reaction in Hong Kong if signature preceded the
conclusion of the UMELCO mission.
we
serious
Strategy for Reassuring Hong Kong
4.
"The weak link in the chain" in Mr Benjamin's letter is
the question of whether Chinese safety precautions will be
sufficient to give confidence that they can prevent an
incident occurring at the Daya Bay plant which could affect
Hong Kong.
The earlier FCO/DTI proposal that UKAEA
officials visit China to learn about the effectiveness of
China's nuclear safety regime is being
being opposed by the
Department of Energy, who fear that the UKAEA would face an
impossible task.
We should try to overcome D.En's
inhibitions and work out a basis on which UKAEA could go to
Peking. There are a number of other steps we might take to
satisfy ourselves about the Chinese safety regime and to
assist the training of Chinese nuclear scientists. Gordon (NED) will be minuting separately on these.
5.
Mr
It will be necessary to involve the French as much as
possible in information and training activities. We may
need to encourage them to take appropriate action, both before and after contracts are signed. We should point out
that it would be in their own interests to contribute to
the effort to allay concern in Hong Kong, since a sustained
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