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might slip without interference by HMG the best line might be to monitor progress via (i) GEC/Framatome (ii) financial negotiations with BOC etc. (iii) JVC (?); if slippage began to seem unlikely we might apply the brakes; if this seemed inadequate/too difficult we would need to make a political approach in Peking.
5. Hum agreed that such a message could be delivered if need be, referring to XU Jiat's recent remarks to Ms Tam. The message could be made more palatable if included in a wider approach on safety aspects etc.
6.
Re Safety/Training Benjamin queried the risks of a Chinese team going to Hong Kong, although this night at least make them more aware of HK's problem. Wilson felt the advantages of such a visit outweighed the risks of an inept per formance in HK.
7. Morphet stressed that there was a limit to what HMG could do to reassure HK in safety aspects. This task must fall to the French and Chinese. D/En had already shown HKG (Yaxley) what UK did in this regard. HMG could also offer to receive Chinese experts under the 1985 Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: but no "magic wand" to wave over Chinese safety system. D/En would also monitor progress of AGA consultancy. As regards an AA visit to China, there should be a Chinese visit to UK first before any ASA visit was contemplated.
8. Benjamin asked if HMG could offer positive comment on French safety standards. D/En felt that in the absence of absolute standards in this field, it would be unwise to go beyond what HMG had already done to reiterate our own commitment to nuclear power: we could not "rubberstamp" French or Chinese stations. Wilson added that in HK terms there might well be a negative effect if we appeared to do so.
9. D/En noted that China had yet to set up a proper regulatory system, but this was not surprising as Daya Bay was not to be commissioned for 7 years. Benjamin asked what we could do to help them build the system up in the meantime through consultations, vists etc. Gordon said that we must first look at the existing Chinese safety set-up in more detail. commission a Nuclear Policy Committee paper, this might provide a basis for deciding what we could then do bilaterally. Possibilities were:
(a)
China/EC visit due for October.
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If we were to
(b) UK/China Agreement basis for inviting a higher level Chinese delegation to visit UK for a longer period than (a) would allow. Morphet suggested a generally worded invitation under the Agrement's provisions: this would then allow both sides to focus on Daya Bay as necessary. Gordon felt the virtues of a "wide" or "narrow" approach to the Chinese should be put to FED to consider.
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