TNAG-1501-FCO40-2059-Guangdong-nuclear-power-station-project-at-Daya-Bay-safety-c-1986 — Page 105

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CONFIDENTIAL

CA Canglong

NOTE OF A MEETING HELD ON 1 AUGUST 1986 IN 1 VICTORIA STREET

Those present:-

389A

Mr Benjamin

Mr Alty

DTI

Mr Williams

ник 160/

Mr Wilson

RECEIVEL NE

Mr Hum

1 4 AUG 1986

Mr Leeks

FCO

Mr Gordon

DEKO FICT INC. X

Mr Raven

FA

Mr Morphet

D/Energy

1

Mr Freeman

The meeting was called by Mr Benjamin to discuss nuclear safety issues on the Guangdong nuclear project.

Deferral of Contract Signature

2 Mr Benjamin noted that there was pressure

pressure in Hong Kong to ensure that contract signature did not occur before publication and discussion of the UMELCO reports.

3 At present there was a high probability that difficulties in the current negotiations between ECGD and the Bank of China might become protracted and hence push back the contractual dates. Therefore there might well be no need to take any action on contract timing to satisfy Hong Kong opinion. However, if matters were to change

change and there appeared to be a prospect of a speedy conclusion to negotiations, then ECGD would probably be able legitimately to spin-out the discussions to achieve a small delay. Should this tactic be insufficient, the ultimate remedy would be

an approach to the Chinese to delay signature.

course however could have serious repercussions for HMG which, if

if seen to be responsible for delays, could face claims for compensation from GEC and the Chinese.

4

This latter

Any deliberate delays would also be resisted by the French who have a much bigger stake in the project and would fear losing their advantage over other PWR manufacturers of supplying the first PWR to China.

5

Mr Wilson described the political aspects of this issue.

6

There was an obligation to meet the pressures being applied on HKG to delay contract signature. Although there was the possibility of serious problems resulting from

resulting from unfavourable conclusions in

in the reports, this was a preferable option to the certain damage to public opinion caused by early signing of contracts. The problem was taking on a wider political significance in relation to the question of how China took account of Hong Kong's opinion.

the

the

7 Generally, the FCO felt that the UMELCO teams would approach the visits with open minds and although it

although it was difficult to predict outcome, the reports were unlikely to be totally opposed to project going ahead.

CONFIDENTIAL

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