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B
5.
At the end of last week the Governor's assessment (Hong Kong telno 2132) was that with few exceptions earlier support for Hong Kong involvement in the project had turned to opposition. He expressed the view that after the LegCo debate on the adjournment scheduled for 16 July we should be fortunate to get through the present Legco session without a further debate, on the motion expressing the view that the Chinese Government should be asked to move the plant (or, presumably, to convert it to a thermal station).
possibly
...
6. On 4 July, however, UMELCO decided to mount their own independent investigation into the safety aspects of
I am (although I
nuclear
power.
I- assume
seeking the Governor's confirmation of this point) that the possibility
therefore of an early hostile motion in Legco has receded.
7. It would be as well, however, to consider what some of /the implications would be if, sooner or later, such
motion was to be tabled and adopted in LegCo. It would
face the
very Hong Kong Govenrment and ourselves with a difficult prospect.
The Governor would be likely to argue
terashe strongly that the only tangible position, for the HKG would
be for official
official members of LegCo to associate themselves with such a motion. Whatever the exact position adopted by officials, the implications of the motion for UK/Hong Kong relations would be serious. Unless we e were seen to be ready to act in Hong Kong's interests, we could face the charge that we were disregarding the fears of the Hong Kong people, motivated only by concerns of commercial gain and our desire to maintain good relations with China.
8. At present this is no more than a hypothesis, and I do
think that it need
directly addressed in Secretary of State's minute. HOW HMG would have
not
be
the
to
respond in such circumstances is difficult to predict ao far ahead. But the minimum needed for HMG to demonstrate
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