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an expert. There were business pressures and pressures among legislators, for a change of line. How this would work out he did not know. (In response to a question) Chiang Jing Kuo was something of an enigma (and undoubtedly unwell). But it was clear that he had issued personal instructions to get on with negotiations over the aircraft.
Taiwan Films
8.
Seizing this opportunity I told Li that I had been looking at the problem of whether or not to let the organisers show one or two non-political Taiwan films in the next Asian Film Festival. We had traditionally been conservative. But on balance, particularly in the new climate, I had it in mind to say yes. My office had always taken good care of known Chinese sensitivities but there was a soundly based artistic argument for broadening the content of the Festival and HKG were under some public pressure to agree. The decision was of course ours, but if Li had any personal comment to make I would be
Xinterested to hear it. Li said right away, no problem. He had
Taiwan
had a similar conversation with Sir Run Run Shaw. The crux for the Chinese was exclusion of the "ROC' label and related insignia. As I would know, the Chinese for their part tried not to show their flag, or insignia, in such contexts. cultural happenings as such did not really present difficulties; and China/Taiwan contacts e.g. in the academic field were positively welcome. Hong Kong had a role to play in this regard.
1988
9.
Li referred to his conversation of 30 May with Sir John Bremridge. The point about 1988 being a tricky year was well taken. Particularly the point about the arrival of the JLG. Li wanted us to know that it was intended that Ke Zaishuo would remain in charge of the JLG when it moved here. We would know that he was an honest type of person,
an honest type of person, who would not, Li
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