TNAG-1493-FCO40-2051-Future-of-Hong-Kong-General-Agreement-on-Tariffs-and-Trade-(-1986 — Page 171

GRS 450 CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS GENEVA

HICK 122/1

RECEIVED

CONFIDENTIAL

ЗАО

OP COPY

INDS

T- "A

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 262

326)

OF 151434Z MAY 1986

INFO PRIORITY HONG KONG, PEKING

1472:

B27

338

330

YOUR TELNO 878 TO HONG KONG AND HONG KONG TELNOS 1399, 1458 AND

HONG KONG AND GATT: STATUS OF HONG KONG'S GENEVA OFFICE

1.

330

WE NOTE THE VIEWS OF BURROWS (HONG KONG TELNO 1458) BUT, AS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY SAND, WHAT MATTERS ULTIMATELY IS THE POSITION WHICH THE SWISS AUTHORITIES WILL TAKE: AND THE ONLY WAY TO ESTABLISH THIS MS TO ASK THEM. THIS WAS THE LINE THE UK TOOK WITH THE CHINESE WHEN ANSWERING THEIR SPECIFIC QUESTION (NO 10) ON THIS ASSUE WHEN WE SAIND THAT 'THE PRECISE STATUS OF THE HONG KONG OFFICE WILL ALSO HAVE TO DEPEND ON THE SWISS GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN ASCERTAINED'' (HONG KONG TELNO 1210).

2. WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN OF THE LINE WHICH THE SWISS AUTHORITIES WILL TAKE. WE NOTE THAT BURROWS DOES NOT CONSIDER THAT ANY TOTALLY SEPARATE HONG KONG MISSION TO GATT WOULD BE ACCORDED FULL #MMUNITIES (IN PARTICULAR IN RESPECT OF WTS PREMISES AND PERHAPS ITS NON-GATT RELATED PAPERS). THIS WOULD, WE PRESUME, HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STATUS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE STAFF. THERE ARE NO REAL PRECEDENTS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT BOTH THE SEPARATE FRENCH AND US GATT OFFICES DERIVE THEIR PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES FROM THEIR MAHN UN MISSIONS. MN THE US CASE THERE 4S AN INTERNAL MEMORANDUM BETWEEN THE STATE

DEPARTMENT AND THE USTR ON THIS POINT.

3. UF INT HIS DECIDED THAT HONG KONG REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD IN FUTURE OPERATE TOTALLY INDEPENDENTLY FROM THIS MISSION (AND THE PARTIAL LOSS OF #MMUNITIES AND, POSSIBLY, OF PRIVILEGES HS ACCEPTABLE), #T SHOULD BE POSSIBLE, AS SUGGESTED, TO ACCREDIT TEMPORARILY GENEVA-BASED HONG KONG OFFICIALS FOR SPECIFIC MEETINGS. WE CANNOT SEE WHY THE SWISS AUTHORITIES SHOULD OBJECT. BUT ONCE AGAIN T

MIGHT BE WORTH ASKING THEM.

4. IT IS A MOOT POINT WHETHER IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO INFORM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT OF OUR INTENTIONS BEFORE WE HAVE SOUNDED OUT THE SWISS AUTHORITIES. THE PACTURE MIGHT LOOK RATHER DIFFERENT WHEN WE KNOW SWISS VIEWS. WHILE WE FULLY UNDERSTAND THE SENSITIÞVHITIES OUTLINED IN PEKING TELNO 667, WE DOUBT WHETHER THE SWISS WOULD RAISE THIS MATTER WITH THE CHINESE IF WE HAD EXPLICITLY ASKED THEM NOT TO DO SO. BUT TALKING TO THE SWISS WOULD CLEARLY INCREASE, AT LEAST MARGINALLY, THE CHANCE OF WORD GETTING BACK TO THE CHINESE.

CONFIDENTIAL

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