TNAG-1478-FCO40-2010-Visit-by-Sir-Geoffrey-Howe--Secretary-of-State-for-Foreign-a-1986 — Page 15

GRS 200

SECRET

FM HONG KONG

TO DESKBY 17100OZ FCO

TELNO 3425

OF 17084OZ OCTOBER 36

INFO PRIORITY PEKING

129

SECRET

FHKK 027/17

VED IN REGISTRY

0 4 NOV 1986

DESK OFFICEA

INDEX

CA

SUISTHY

Taken

YOUR TELNO 2274: SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO HONG KONG

AT THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ON 11 OCTOBER DISCUSSION FOCUSSED ON THE TACTICS FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO PEKING, INCLUDING THE PAPERS TO BE HANDED OVER AND THE GOVERNOR AND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE PROPOSALS. THERE WERE

BRIEF REFERENCES TO THE 1987 REVIEW AND DAYA BAY.

2. ON TACTICS FOR PEKING, MEMBERS ENDORSED THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VIEW THAT HE SHOULD NOT HAND OVER THE PAPER ON DIRECT ELECTIONS UNLESS AN OBVIOUS OPPORTUNITY AROSE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN WORRIED ABOUT A PAPER SO STARKLY ENTITLED **DIRECT ELECTIONS''. THIS COULD CONJURE UP IN CHINESE MINDS THE FEELING THAT WE WERE INTENT ON INTRODUCING THESE. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO INTRODUCE THE PAPER AT A LATER DATE IN A LESS STARK, MORE COMPACT FORM WITH DETAIL REMOVED TO AN ANNEX. THE SECRETARY OF STATE INFORMED MEMBERS THAT HE HAD ALREADY TAKEN THE OPPORTUNITY OF HIS MEETING AT THE UNGA WITH MR WU XUEGIAN TO

IMPRESS UPON THE CHINESE THE NEED TO KEEP AN OPEN MIND ON THE SUBJECT AND THAT MR WU APPEARED TO HAVE TAKEN THE POINT.

3. ON THE GOVERNOR AND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT MINISTERS WOULD LIKE TO LOOK AT THE PROPOSALS IN

MORE DEPTH BEFORE PUTTING IN A PAPER. HE SUMMARISED MINISTERS'

CONCERNS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THE DANGERS OF SOMEONE BEING APPOINTED AS CHIEF EXECUTIVE

PRIOR TO 1997 WHO WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO US SEMICOLON

(B) THE OPPOSITE RISK OF SOMEONE BEING APPOINTED BEFORE 1997 WHO

WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO PEKING, AND THUS NOT SURVIVE THE TRANSITION SEMICOLON

(C) THE DIFFICULTIES OF RECONCILING THE NEED FOR AS COMPLETE A

DIVESTMENT OF THE GOVERNOR'S POWERS PRIOR TO 1997 WITH THAT OF MAINTAINING HMG'S AUTHORITY RIGHT UP TO 30 JUNE 1997. NEVERTHELESS IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT THE IDEAL WOULD BE THAT THERE WOULD BE NOTHING LEFT TO TRANSFER WHEN THE GOVERNOR

LEFT SEMICOLON

(D) THE RISKS OF MAKING OUR DISPOSITIONS TOO EARLY. HOWEVER THE SECRETARY OF STATE UNDERSTOOD THAT ACTION WAS NECESSARY NOW AS THE MATTER WAS ALREADY BEING DISCUSSED IN THE BLDC.

SECRET

14

130

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