CONFIDENTIAL
Чел
idsed
views. Although Miss Tam was being briefed by the Hong Kong Government, he was surprised that she sometimes took a line at variance with what he believed to be HKG views: this perplexed him, and might well mislead the Chinese side
as well.
4.
You and I discussed this point briefly. We agreed that I should write to Mr Peirce in Hong Kong, suggesting that the Hong Kong Government might wish to consider giving Mr Lee slightly more comprehensive briefing if they thought that he was discreet enough to make diplomatic use of it.
5. Mr Lee's second theme was criticism of HMG and the HKG for not fighting hard enough for Hong Kong's interests. An
An assumpter agreement had been achieved which gave Hong Kong the real
here that there is a Commony accepted News of What i
best for tele
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in o
Sork structure. Brwor So.
hope of autonomy.
a way which
said rather
But now HMG and the HKG were only
concerned about bringing about convergence in
caused the fewest waves in Peking. Mr Lee
Lee said
sadly that the people of Hong Kong needed leadership: they had to be helped. They were not accustomed to speaking up
for themselves. HMG and the
the Hong Kong Government should
in Peking on speak up strongly in
The their behalf.
two
Governments should also encourage the emergence of a more outspoken political class. Almost all the Unofficials were no more than yes men: they were only concerned not to rock the boat. HMG and the HKG should bring forward politicians of a more independent frame of mind, and should actively encourage the rest to speak out on behalf of Hong Kong.
6. You and I agreed that I should summarise the main points from our two conversations with Mr Lee in a letter
to Mr Peirce.
HRK ON 615
RECEN
1 & AL 1985
uly 1986
29 puly
سلى
CO Hum
FOBIS
Hong Kong Department
CONFIDENTIAL
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