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(15% below the
rst to express concern over the 1985 grain harvest 1984 record). This was far from a disaster. But it was a public relations setback for the reformers, especially as 1985 had been the start of the second stage of agricultural reform. They have since taken measures to improve production, but there were signs of anxiety over the spring sowing and another poor harvest might reopen
the issue.
7. For all this, the grip of the reformers on political power does not seem to have been weakened. Deng Xiaoping, after an absence from view, has reappeared and seems as fit as ever and remains There are no indications that the positions of his chosen successors, Hu Yaobang (Head of the Party) and Zhao Ziyang
The following (Head of Government), have been undermined.
paramount.
generation of future leaders (including Vice-Premier Li Peng), young, technically-minded and committed to Deng's policies, is increasing in experience and confidence.
8.
Three groups remain critical of Deng Xiaoping and the current economic strategy. These are: unreconstructed Maoists; those who have lost, or who might lose, their jobs because their levels of education and technical competence are too low; and those who share Deng's ambition to make China rich and strong as quickly as possible, but who believe that some of the methods he has encouraged are un- or even anti-communist. Of these, the first two groups are now weak and largely discredited. The last group, whose criticisms are issue rather than programme-relaced, is more formidable. the leadership has done much to defuse these criticisms by modifying policy to take account of them. Debate will continue about the optimism extent of foreign contacts and domestic market economies. But, while Deng remains, major policy change will be most unlikely. Deng's eventual departure will pose a more serious test for the reformists. But even then, the threat will be stagnation rather
than reversal.
But
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