TNAG-1461-FCO40-1987-Future-of-the-Dependent-Territories-Hong-Kong--Gibraltar-and-1986 — Page 78

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VI CONCLUSIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

41. The 1973 review suggested that Bermuda, and the five Caribbean.

territories considered here could all in principle cease to be dependent territories within the time limit of the review. Significantly this has not happened despite incrased strains on HMG's overseas spending. If the governments of any of these territories decided to become independent, the United Kingdom would

have no option but to help them. It is difficult to foresee any

other option than independence or the status quo for these

territories, except for the British Virgin Islands which could opt

to become part of the United States. Independence might be a spring

board for joint arrangements for security under the aegis of the

OECS, OAS or Commonwealth but certainly cannot be asumed. Given the

reluctance of the Caribbean islands to seek independence themselves,

should HMG now shift, in an effort to implement at least part of the

1973 policy recommendations, from a passive attitude to Caribbean

independence of waiting for them to make the first move to a more active policy of promoting that independence? In summary the main

problems associated with a more active policy are clear:

a) the practical and legal difficulties given their size and

economic underdevelopment;

b) the added financial inducement necessary to convince the

territories of the attractions of independence;

c) the implications that independence would have for other UK

dependent territories (eg Falklands) even allowing for the

different circumstances in the Caribbean;

d) the need for, and possible difficulties arising from,

securing agreement with the US;

e) lack of Parliamentary or public interest in moving from the

status quo.

CONFIDENTIAL

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