TNAG-1461-FCO40-1987-Future-of-the-Dependent-Territories-Hong-Kong--Gibraltar-and-1986 — Page 28

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CONFIDENTIAL

Once our intentions in one Caribbean island are known however there will be intense speculation elsewhere and it will be difficult to keep the issues separate. A strategy for dealing with others, eg the Caymans, where opposition can be expected would need to be in place.

37 There will be a great deal of parish pump anxiety, possibly transmitted to both Washington and Westminster. It is therefore important that HMG should take and retain the initiative over the presentation of its policy to Parliament, to the United States and to other regional Governments, including those of the

dependent territories concerned. We must emphasise from the outset that what is contemplated is not the start of a process of complete UK disengagement from the Caribbean irrespective of the consequences in the region. We think it right however to equip

the territories better than they are now for the status of

independence when this comes. The basis of our public line must

be to confirm that the wishes of the inhabitants will be

respected and to counter any spurious comparisons between the

different dependent territories. There are indeed clear

differences between the Falklands on the one hand and the

Caribbean on the other: the former is situated close to a large

hostile power, the latter to a large friendly power; the former

is economically dependent on the UK, the latter on the US far

more than the UK; the former has never expressed any wish to be independent, while in the latter some of the leaders have

indicated an interest in seeking independence. And so on.

Contingent defensive publicity needs to be worked out.

IX

ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEPENDENCIES IN THE UK

38 A factor that has tended to reduce the efficient

administration of the dependent territories in recent years has

been the increased involvement of non-FCO departments in their

affairs. Financial, shipping, telecommunications and drug

questions, as well as aid and security aspects, have all led non-FCO departments to deal more or less directly with dependent

territory affairs. No regular committee machinery has existed to

coordinate this involvement or to ensure that the FCO Ministers,

or those responsible to Parliament, are in a position to ensure

CONFIDENTIAL