TNAG-1461-FCO40-1987-Future-of-the-Dependent-Territories-Hong-Kong--Gibraltar-and-1986 — Page 16

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deprive the UK of power in the dependent territories without freeing us of responsibility. However we note that Premier Swan has recently asked informally that associated status be considered as an interim measure for Bermuda. The motives lying behind this request and the consequences of assenting to it need careful contingency examination. (We do not yet know whether there will be a formal request).

Options for increasing the ties with the UK, also have drawbacks. This is especially true of integration with Britain which would need to be combined with the granting of UK

citizenship. This brings with it the assumption of

representation at Westminster. The implications of this are not examined further here but they clearly pose a whole range of new

considerations.

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Against these general thoughts what options are available for each of the territories? In the Caribbean and Bermuda there

is no reason for HMG to consider a major change from the present

course aimed at eventual independence. With the right amount and

type of assistance they are perfectly capable of taking greater

control of their own affairs (see Section VI). Defence

facilities on Bermuda will remain valuable both to the US and

ourselves for the foreseeable future, but there is no reason why

access need be threatened by independence and this should not be regarded as a bar to independence. In the Caribbean, a region

bound up with US (rather than UK) security interests, there is every reason over the long term to limit our military involvement and ensure as far as possible that UK resources are not diverted

from higher priority tasks. The political arguments are more

complex. As already noted, local attitudes to independence (with

the possible exception of Bermuda) are negative. In terms of the

influence that our presence can bring, experience shows that

maintaining a commitment as a way of "moderating" the US's

actions in its own backyard has no credibility. US actions in

Grenada, Nicaragua and earlier the Dominican Republic have all demonstrated their preparedness to act alone when in their

judgement (and irrespective of the views of others) they consider

There may be wider, trade-off arguments (eg

it necessary.

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