TNAG-1459-FCO40-1983-Relations-between-Hong-Kong-and-Macau-1986 — Page 55

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would see advantage in making an input. He offered himself as

a confidential channel. I said that:

(a) we were of course interested in the negotiations.

There was the well known problem of spillover if they were mishandled. We had the clear impression that the Chinese saw this point;

(b) I was aware e.g. from my airport chat with the new

Governor that Portuguese preparations were not in

an advanced state;

(c) it would naturally be very helpful if Sir R Lobo

would pass on to us anything he learned;

(d) On inputs, it was importantnot to give the Chinese

the impression that we were trying the manipulate

the Macau negotiations. (Sir R Lobo agreed). Hong Kong inputs were unlikely therefore to be

many; and any would have to be kept strictly

confidential; it went without saying that Sir R

Lobo would be our preferred local channel.

(e) however, as a general steer, it might be useful

for the Portuguese Ambassador in Peking to stay in

close touch with Sir R Evans.

5.

Sir Roger Lobo was content:

he would promote (e) and

keep us posted.

HKK

02013

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY

2 7 JUN 1986

DESK OFFICER INDER

PA

(JD I Boyd)

PA

13.6.86

AB0761

cc PS/GH, DPA, SGD, HSG, DEB, SecLic

Dr D C Wilson CMG, FCO

PA B Thomson Esq, PEKIĮ

CONFIDENTIAL