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the Joint Declaration to consult. We would need to explain to the Chinese how we envisaged that the post would fit within the Hong Kong Government structure, how the incumbent would be selected and how powers would be progressively delegated to him. If we sought to go ahead without consultation with the
Chinese the objective of a smooth transition, brought about in co-operation with China, could not be achieved.
16.
Such consultation, if it led to agreement and to the
appointment of an individual who would bridge the change of sovereignty in 1997, would offer us a valuable means of
acquiring enhanced influence over events after 1997, because
the first Chief Executive would be a candidate acceptable to
ourselves as well as to the Chinese Government. It is true
that as a quid pro quo we would have conceded to the Chinese influence over an appointment made before 1997. But the bargain would be in our favour. We would retain full responsibility for the administration of Hong Kong up to 30
June 1997, as the Joint Declaration provides. We would retain
control over the process by which the candidate was appointed, both in the early 1990s and nearer 1997. This formal power would give us the means of resisting any attempt by the Chinese to impose on Hong Kong before 1997 a Chief Executive (designate) who would not be acceptable to ourselves or to the
people of Hong Kong.
17. The powers delegated or devolved to the Chief Executive (Designate) could be resumed if the need arose,
either because of his inadequacy or because of external factors (although we should not underestimate the political difficulty of doing so). The aim would be however to devolve
to him by 1997 all the powers to be exercised by the Chief
Executive after 1997, so as to lessen the likelihood that the
Chinese might be tempted, even against the provisions of the Joint Declaration, to retain such powers for themselves after
the change of sovereignty.
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