TNAG-1448-FCO40-1947-Executive-Council-of-Hong-Kong-memoranda-and-minutes-of-meet-1986 — Page 105

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Declaration by maintaining direct responsibility for the administration of Hong Kong until 1997, in practice our

authority would be weakened by the existence of a

Chinese-appointed Chief Executive waiting in the wings. His

choice would be entirely a matter for the PRC. We would have

no means of influencing the establishment or the filling of his post.

10.

Such an abrupt break in 1997 would be fraught with

risk for Hong Kong. It would be the opposite of the smooth

transition which we are committed to achieve. The Chief

Executive would have no experience of high authority and responsibility when he assumed all his functions on 1 July

1997. Nor would the legislature or the Civil Service be

accustomed to working with the post or the individual.

Option (B)

11.

Option (B) might involve action in two stages before 1997. The post of Deputy Governor could be created and filled within the Hong Kong Government in the early 1990s. The powers which will be exercised by the Chief Executive after 1997 would be gradually delegated or devolved to the occupant of the post from the Governor. The Governor would retain ultimate authority and specific responsibility, under the direction of HMG, for foreign affairs, defence and security.

Nearer 1997 it would be filled by a person, selected in

consultation with the Chinese, who could bridge the gap and

hold office as Chief Executive after 1997.

12.

Option (B) would help to ensure convergence with the post-1997 Government structure and meet the need for a smooth transition. It would indicate to the Hong Kong people in advance the way in which the transition would be handled. would reduce apprehension. In particular it would enable the

It

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